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This thesis addresses the First Crusade with a focus on the crusaders’ logistics during the course 
of the campaign. It addresses the campaign in three phases, each the focus of its own chapter. 
The first chapter covers the preparatory phase of the crusade which began with the Council of 
Clermont in 1095 and lasted through the siege of Nicaea in 1097. Crusader logistics in the 
preparatory phase, though negatively affected by five years of ecological crisis, operated under 
familiar regimes, and benefitted from the support of their Byzantine allies. In the second phase of 
the Crusade, from 1097 through 1098, the crusaders departed Nicaea and their Byzantine allies 
crossing into Asia Minor and Syria. This transition carried the crusaders beyond the reach of 
Byzantine infrastructure, and into an unfamiliar and often hostile landscape. At Antioch, the 
crusaders suffered the greatest number of losses of any siege in the Crusade, with the winter 
months posing the greatest challenge to their logistical systems. The final phase the Crusade was 
drastically different than the previous phases. In this phase, the armies of the First Crusade 
separated into two factions, and took disparate paths south before reuniting at Arqah. Isolated 
from the Mediterranean Sea and the crusaders’ familiar logistical system, Raymond IV of St. 
Gilles was forced to adapt his logistical approach to guarantee his faction’s survival in enemy 
territory. In approaching the First Crusade from a primarily logistical perspective, this thesis 
vi 
 
shifts the focus from the battles and tactics, to address the support systems which enabled the 






“You may rest assured that we are now besieging Antioch with all diligence and hope to 
soon capture it. The city is supplied to an incredible extent with grain, wine, oil and all kinds of 
food.”1 So wrote Anselm of Ribemont in a letter to the Archbishop of Reims in February of 1098 
as the Christian army of the First Crusade sat encamped on the outskirts of the Syrian city. Yet, 
despite the hope conveyed in these words, the reality faced by the crusaders was bleak. The siege 
of Antioch would last from October 1097 until June 1098, the longest and most taxing military 
engagement of the First Crusade. Throughout the siege, the crusaders were plagued by 
starvation, exhausting their stores of provisions, scavenging what scarce foodstuffs could be 
found in the surrounding areas, and unable to resupply while the city stood. However, at the end 
of the siege, the city’s stores were revealed to have been likewise devastated and devoid of food, 
crushing the crusaders’ hopes of resupplying upon its capture. Unable to resupply, the exhausted 
armies of the First Crusade would soon find themselves likewise besieged within Antioch by the 
Seljuk forces under Kerbogha, their hopes and expectations of respite crushed beneath the 
campaign’s bleak reality. Had God abandoned them? 
Their predicament had been at least two years in the making. In 1095, Pope Urban II 
preached the sermon that sparked this first of the Crusades.2 Traditionally, the Crusades have 
been conceived as two centuries of relatively consistent warfare between European Christians 
and Islamic powers in the Middle East which concluded with the crusaders’ defeat at Acre and 
 
1 Munro, Dana Carleton. Letters of the crusaders (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1902) 4. 
2 “Crusade” as a term did not exist in any meaningful way during the First Crusade. Christopher Tyerman 
claims that the term, as it is now understood, was likely coined in the early 1700s. The First crusaders understood 
their campaign more in terms of a journey or a pilgrimage. The earliest usage of a term even resembling “Crusade” 
did not come about until the fourteenth century with the French croisade- “path of the Cross,” which referred to the 
processes involved in raising funds for one such journey. Tyerman addresses this in greater detail in both his 2011 
book The Debate on Crusades and his 2019 The World of the Crusades.  
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expulsion from the Middle East in 1291. Following Acre, the Crusades and ideas of Crusading 
persisted as a cultural force in Europe throughout the High Middle Ages and the Renaissance.3 
The predominant European military powers involved included Frankish, Germanic, and English 
forces on the side of the Christians, and the Islamic powers of the Seljuk Turks, and the Fatimid 
and Abbasid Caliphates. These wars have been analyzed from a variety of historical perspectives 
including religious, political, gender, economic and military studies. Logistical issues concerning 
supplies of food for the armies, while a vital factor in the crusaders’ varying degrees of success 
in the repeated conflicts, have received far less focus than the individual battles, tactics, and 
commanders. Even less of the scholarship regarding crusader logistics fully account for 
environmental factors, such as seasonal drought, seasonal weather, and topography, affecting the 
availability of and the crusaders’ capacity to transport food, fodder, weapons, armor, building 
supplies, and money. Given the considerable importance of logistics in influencing the outcome 
of any given military engagement, it merits greater consideration than it has received.  
This thesis argues that the crusaders’ successes, trials, tribulations and the ultimate 
victory during the First Crusade resulted from their ability to extract and transport food, drink, 
and equipment to their armies both while on the march and during prolonged military 
engagements. This argument stands in nuanced contrast to that posited by John France in Victory 
in the East attributing the Crusade leaders’ experience and skill as military commanders, 
bolstered by the crusaders’ faith in God, their faith in themselves and in their leaders, as the 
 
3 Jonathan Riley-Smith argues in The Crusades: A History that the Crusades existed as part of an 
overarching movement in Europe which persisted until 1798 with the Hospitallers of St. John’s final surrender to 
Napoleon. The reason for identifying the Fall of Acre in 1291 as the end of the Crusades is because it was that 
specific defeat which ended the crusaders permanent occupation of Middle Eastern territory. The idea of Crusading 
lived on, and continued to influence developments in Western European countries, but their presence in a Middle 
Eastern arena was over. 
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primary cause for their victory.4 For France, logistics play a tertiary role behind considerations 
such as battle tactics and military prowess. In this study, it is logistical proficiency that 
determines available tactical options and influenced the leaders’ approach to the Crusade.  
Regarding logistics, John Lynn writes that “Mars must be fed… The soldiers who 
practice his craft need food, clothing, and equipment. All these must be produced, transported 
and distributed to contending forces if they are to begin or continue the contest.”5 Logistics then 
refers to the systems and processes for moving the necessary equipment, supplies, provisions, 
specifically defined as supplies of food and drink needed for a long journey, and people for 
military operations. For the purposes of this thesis, food and drink will be the foremost focus, 
as they are the factors the crusaders most frequently struggled with in the First Crusade. In 
terms of historiography, studies of logistics deal with questions regarding how war was 
prepared and supplied as opposed to questions over motives, individual battles, and tactics.6 
As such, logistics addresses questions regarding military provisioning, the process of 
supplying an army’s food, drink, and equipment, especially those necessary for a journey or 
campaign. Generally speaking, logistics have been applied as a focus of study in post-18th 
century wars, though this is in part due to the lack of consideration medieval and premedieval 
historians and chroniclers paid to such details.7 However, medieval armies and military 
leaders had to account for such considerations if they sought victory on the field of battle. 
One persistent logistical issue the crusaders faced in their campaign through the Middle East 
was that of provisioning food and water for their masses of armed knights, the unarmed 
 
4 John France, Victory in the East: A military history of the First Crusade. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). 25, 373. While logistical proficiency can be considered an aspect of military skill, France is 
more focused on battles and tactics rather than the logistical systems the crusade leaders implemented to support 
their activities. 
5 John A. Lynn. Feeding Mars. (Boulder;San Francsico;Oxford: Westview Press, 1993) vii. 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 Ibid., 6. 
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peasants accompanying the armies, and their animals which included livestock, beasts of 
burden, and warhorses. In addition to the human lives lost due to starvation from lack of 
provisions, these issues negatively affected the crusaders’ fighting ability as they lost valuable 
warhorses the knights needed to engage the enemy. During their campaign, the First crusaders 
sought to move armies en masse from Europe through the Middle East to realize the goal of 
liberating Jerusalem from Muslim hands. Their stated objective required the invasion, and 
eventually included the occupation, of Middle Eastern lands, a task which the nobility 
amongst the crusade leaders addressed with care. Therefore, the question remains, why were 
logistics such a persistent problem for the crusaders, and how did they succeed despite this 
challenge? 
 To answer this question, this thesis addresses the First Crusade from 1095 through 1099 
divided into three stages, each the focus of its own chapter, beginning with the preparatory phase 
of the First Crusade from the Council of Clermont in 1095 to the crusaders’ departure from 
Byzantine lands after the battle of Nicaea in 1097, the march from Nicaea to conclusion of the 
siege of Antioch in 1098, and finally, the march from Antioch to the crusaders’ ultimate victory 
at the siege of Jerusalem in 1099. In the First Crusade, the crusaders did not enjoy the benefit of 
landholdings from the outset of the campaign. This meant that more so than in the later Crusades, 
the crusaders would be reliant on Europe and the Byzantine Empire for transporting the bulk of 
their food to the armies. Despite this additional strain, the crusaders managed to be victorious in 
their stated mission of liberating Jerusalem. During the later Crusades by contrast, the crusaders 
occupied territory within the Middle East, marking a change in their status from an invading 
force to a residential occupying force, as well as a change in their potential sources of provisions. 
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Yet despite these advantages, the crusaders ultimately failed in each of their later Middle Eastern 
campaigns’ stated missions.  
In each chapter, this thesis analyzes how the crusaders sought to acquire and transport 
enough food to satisfy the needs of their armies, who at the height of their strength numbered 
around 60,000 combatants and noncombatants, around 20,000 horses, as well as the thousands of 
pack animals they used to move their supplies. Included within this analysis will be observations 
availability of provisions on the environmental factors which dictated availability of provisions, 
namely agricultural productivity and aridity.8 In addition, it is necessary to address medieval 
religious belief, particularly those which concern sin, penance, and the relation between religion 
the physical world, as this relationship helped provide a motivation for the First Crusade.  
As with any historical research, writing the story of the First Crusade requires evidence 
from those who lived through it. For written primary sources, the accounts of Albert of Aachen 
from around 1102, Fulcher of Chartres’ account completed in 1127, Robert the Monk’s Historia 
from as early as 1106-1107, Raymond D’Aguilers and Baldric of Bourgueil whose respective 
works were finished prior to 1105, as well as the works of Peter Tudebode from 1111 and 
Guibert of Nogent completed as early as 1106 all provide European perspectives on the First 
Crusade. Many of these works build upon the anonymously produced eye-witness account 
 
8 Such considerations will be framed within the context of the Medieval Climate Optimum, a climatic phase 
first identified by H. H. Lamb in 1965, which exhibited generally higher temperatures and increased rainfall 
throughout Europe as compared to the Little Ice Ages which preceded and followed the period. The Climate 
Optimum lasted from around the ninth through thirteenth centuries during which time agricultural production 
experienced drastic growth, due to a multiplicity of factors ranging from climatic conditions to technological and 
agricultural advancements. During this period, farming expanding to altitudes and latitudes previously uncultivable 
since the time of the Roman Empire. This warming trend was not universal in its manifestations, with different 
regional trends appearing across the globe during the period, however, the European experience of the Optimum was 
generally beneficial for agriculture. The Middle East on the contrary experienced prolonged periods of drought. 
Such considerations have been addressed in the following works, John Aberth. An Environmental History of the 
Middle Ages: The Crucible of Nature. (London: Routledge Ltd, 2013.) xiv-xv. Richard C. Hoffmann. An 
Environmental History of Medieval Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 322. Yochanan 
Kushnir, and Moerdechai Stein. “Medieval Climate in the Eastern Mediterranean: Instability and Evidence of Solar 
Forcing” Atmosphere 10, (2019) 1-24 
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entitled Gesta Francorum which is believed to have been first compiled as early as 1101.9 Of 
these authors, only the Gesta author, Fulcher of Chartres, Peter Tudebode, and Raymond 
D’Aguilers personally participated in the First Crusade, with Guibert, Baldric, Albert and Robert 
all writing their works in the aftermath. In addition to the works of European chroniclers, 
crusader letters written while on campaign provide further eyewitness accounts of the Crusade. 
Furthermore, Anna Comnena’s The Alexiad, which was published in 1148, and the Islamic 
chronicler Ibn Al-Qalanisi’s Damascus Chronicle of the Crusade published some time before his 
death in 1159, provide additional details and interpretations the Crusade from Byzantine and 
Islamic perspectives. However, as this thesis relies on the Christian chroniclers for the majority 
of its primary source data, it is necessary to analyze their works more closely, beginning with 
Robert the Monk.  
Robert the Monk, who finished his Historia around 1107, was cloistered at the monastery 
of St-Rémi in the bishopric of Reims, writing after the events of the First Crusade after its 
completion under the orders of his abbot. He claims to have witnessed Urban II’s speech at 
Clermont in 1095 in person.10 As he was not among the Crusade’s participants, his account of the 
conflict was compiled after the Crusade’s completion utilizing the written and oral sources made 
available by former crusaders, of which Gesta Francorum served as a main primary source.11 
Robert’s Historia seems to have been commissioned by his abbot for its value as propaganda, 
calling on the First crusaders’ success to garner support for a Second Crusade into the Holy Land 
to reclaim territories lost in the interim.12 Robert’s writing style leans heavily on scripture and 
 
9 Rosalind M. T. Hill. ed. Gesta Francorum: The Deeds of the Franks and the other pilgrims to Jerusalem 
(New York: Oxford University Press: 1962) ix-x. 
10 Carol Sweetenham. Robert the Monk’s History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana 
(Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 4. 
11 Ibid., 4-5. 
12 Ibid., 6-7. 
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hyperbole. He presents the Crusade leaders as heroes of the faith and the very agents of God’s 
will on earth. In addition to their piety, Robert praises their martial skill. One example of this is 
seen in his description of Godfrey of Bouillon before the Crusade’s start. Robert writes,  
Godfrey was handsome, of lordly bearing, eloquent, of distinguished character, and so 
lenient with his soldiers as to give the impression of being a monk rather than a soldier. 
However, when he realized that the enemy was at hand and battle imminent, his courage 
became abundantly evident and like a roaring lion he feared the attack of no man. What 
breastplate or shield could withstand the thrust of his sword?13  
 
Robert is exaggerating, describing the prince as superhuman to behold. Godfrey was to be seen 
as a prince pious and merciful to his subjects, and invincible to his enemies. Here is what his 
audience, the would-be participants in the Second Crusade should aspire to, the legacy they 
could share in. Against such pious and gallant princes, he places the villainy of the Muslims. The 
atrocities he attributes to them are of biblical proportions.14 Chief of their depravities is the 
occupation and defilement of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. As God’s agents in the Muslims’ 
removal from the Holy Land, the crusaders’ actions and victories were explained and justified by 
the simple, three-word phrase, “Deus lo vult.” God wills it. As such, every action, event and 
happenstance that the crusaders experienced was due to God’s activity among their ranks.  
In similar manner to Robert’s work, Albert of Aachen’s Historia, completed around 
1102, utilized survivor accounts of the Crusade selected by Albert himself to present an account 
he was not present to witness.15 Among the chroniclers, Albert appears to be a generally 
empathetic figure towards each group involved in the Crusade. He does not denigrate non-Latin 
Christians either in the Middle East or in the Byzantine Empire.  In further contrast to his fellow 
chronicler, he recognizes the distinction between Turk and Saracen amongst the crusaders’ 
 
13 Ibid., 84.  
14 Ibid., 80. 
15 Susan B. Edgington. Albert of Aachen’s history of the Journey to Jerusalem: Volume 1: Books 1-6. The 
First Crusade, 1095-1099. (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013) 3. 
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enemies and does not indulge in denouncing them as an abominable race or any similar insult, 
even praising them where their actions were admirable.16 He is also critical of the crusaders in 
several cases indicating where their actions were in the wrong, such as with the case with the 
People’s Crusade’s plundering of Byzantine lands and the crusaders’ massacre of the Jews in 
Cologne.17 
If Albert was empathetic, and Robert prone to exaggeration, Guibert of Nogent was a 
Frankish elitist. Completing his work as early as 1106, Guibert believed the First Crusade 
represented an important chapter in Frankish history. As such, his Gesta Dei per Francos, 
translated to The Deeds of God through the Franks, seeks to present the campaign as a largely 
Frankish affair. His elitism is made apparent in the disparaging tone he adopts towards the 
People’s Crusade and the less wealthy participants of the main wave of crusaders. He goes into 
detail about the ecological crisis present in France from 1090-1095, addressing the rampant 
poverty and famine it caused. Despite this, he denounces as absurd the desperation and haste that 
the people took in their preparations to depart. He writes, “hard times reduced everyone’s wealth, 
nevertheless, when the hard times provoked everyone to spontaneous exile, the wealth of many 
men came out into the open, and what had seemed expensive when no one was moved, was sold 
at a cheap price… seven sheep brought an unheard-of price of five cents…”18 In his assessment 
of the People’s Crusade, he treats the group as an unruly mob, and Peter as an incapable leader 
who only held his position through his popularity as a preacher. By contrast, he lauds the 
princes’ careful administration and diligence in raising the necessary funds for the journey.19 He 
 
16 Ibid., 8-9. 
17 Ibid., 29, 38-9. 
18 Robert Levine, The Deeds of God through the Franks by Guibert of Nogent, (Middlesex:The Echo 
Library, 2008), 41-2. 
19 Ibid., 42. 
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does not indulge in the level of praise exhibited by Robert the Monk, but he clearly views the 
noble leaders with a degree of respect and deference that he denies Peter and the People. 
Baldric of Bourgueil and Ralph of Caen are the last of the chroniclers who did not 
participate in the Crusade. Completing his Historia in 1105, Baldric is similar to Guibert and 
Robert in their usage of Gesta Francorum as their main primary source, but in terms of 
temperament he more closely resembles Albert. Baldric recognizes the Byzantines’ support for 
as an absolute necessity in the crusaders’ activities in the East. As such, where Guibert, Robert, 
and several of the eyewitnesses accuse Alexius I of being cowardly or conniving, Baldric 
recognizes justifiable caution. For Baldric the crusaders were not superhuman religious heroes, 
they were human, fallible, prone to avarice, but not incapable of goodness either.20 Ralph of 
Caen, by contrast, favors Robert in style if not topic. His Gesta Tancredi, completed around 
1118, highlights the Norman contributions to the Crusade, though it is primarily those of 
Bohemond and Tancred, and not of Robert of Normandy.21 He reasons for doing so seem to have 
been in offering a corrective to other accounts of the Crusade which present, an overly Franco-
centric narrative. The result of his endeavors is an account of Tancred and Bohemond’s exploits 
in the Crusade which rivals Robert’s predilection of hero-worship. Where the account diverts its 
gaze from the Norman princes, it provides more details about the crusaders’ battle tactics which 
are useful to determining what would have been needed for the campaign. On the topic of 
hyperbole, neither Robert nor Ralph cannot afford to present unbelievable accounts in either of 
their stated missions. The basic events of the Crusade accounts line up with those of the 
 
20 Susan B. Edgington, Baldric of Bourgueil “History of the Jerusalemites”: A Translation of the Historia 
Ierosolmitana. (New York: The Boydell Press, 2020), 76-7. Baldric calls Baldwin and Tancred equal in terms of 
integrity, yet also recognizes their greed as the primary motivation for their expedition to Edessa.  
21 Bernard S. Bachrach and David S. Bachrach. The Gesta Tancredi of Ralph of Caen: A history of the 
Normans on the First Crusade. (Abigndon: Taylor & Francis Group, 2016) 7.  
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eyewitnesses even if the motivations and explanations read as embellishment. It is in those basic 
facts where different details are made evident that these accounts can be relied upon. 
For eyewitness accounts, this thesis draws from the anonymous author of Gesta 
Francorum, Peter Tudebode, Raymond D’Aguilers and Fulcher of Chartres. The four authors 
began the Crusade in three camps. The Gesta author set out with Bohemond’s army, but later 
joined with Raymond IV’s forces. Peter Tudebode and Raymond D’Aguilers accompanied 
Raymond IV of St. Gilles in his army of Provencals from the beginning of the Crusade, while 
Fulcher of Chartres followed Robert of Normandy until joining with Baldwin of Boulogne as he 
departed to take Edessa before returning to the rest of the crusader armies, then stationed outside 
Antioch. 
The most important of these authors, at least in terms of influence, is ironically the one 
about whom the least is known. The author of Gesta Francorum, which seems to have been 
completed in 1101, never provides his name, or station, yet his writing style and focus suggests 
that he was a knight or soldier rather than a priest, like Raymond and Fulcher.22 He identifies the 
waves of Christians departing France and Germany as armies from the beginning of his 
narrative, and suggests that the people in various towns they travelled through harbored no 
delusions about whether the crusaders were pilgrims or invaders.23 At Castoria, he freely admits 
that the crusaders plundered the town when they were refused use of the market, setting it ablaze 
before leaving, yet he does not seem to render any moral judgement on this action. This stands in 
sharp contrast to his assessment of the People’s Crusade as he blames the Christian’s abominable 
behavior which included pillaging, arson, and theft, against the Byzantines for their banishment 
from Constantinople. This is the only time in his narrative that the Gesta author suggests 
 
22 Hill. Gesta Francorum, ix. 
23 Ibid. 2, 8. 
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Alexius’ actions against the crusaders to be justified. The Gesta author is content in his account 
to present the campaign as primarily military affair with a religious motivation. God is not absent 
from the narrative, but it was through martial prowess and valor that he suggests the crusaders 
were victorious. 
Completing his own Historia in 1105, Raymond D’Aguilers offers his perspective on the 
Crusade as a chaplain for Raymond IV. Raymond D’Aguilers can be seen as a crusader 
apologist, as he freely admits to being at the start of his narrative. His perspective is that of a 
man who believes that the crusaders’ journey was one of holy inspiration and design, and as such 
he has little tolerance for the Byzantines, whom he repeatedly reviles as traitors to their alliance 
with the crusaders.24 As a man of the cloth rather than one of steel, Raymond attributes the 
crusaders’ victories to God’s intervention and their sufferings and failings to their own sins. 
Where Raymond shines is in his descriptions of the cities and his perceptions of the events. In 
addressing both the crusaders times of plenty and of famine, he writes of the former, “Even those 
who stayed in camp enjoyed the high life so that they ate only the best cuts, rump and shoulders, 
scorned brisket and thought nothing of grain and wine.”25 Then during the famine, “Our 
victorious army consequently came back to camp without provisions and the ensuing famine 
drove prices so high that two solidi scarcely had the purchasing power to one day’s bread rations 
for one man.”26 Raymond’s account is useful because of these details and descriptions more so 
than its handling of the larger-scale events of the Crusade. 
Peter Tudebode is the next eyewitness, and his account, completed in 1111 has been seen 
as controversial by some Crusade historians. John Hugh Hill and Laurita L. Hill, who provide the 
 
24 John H. Hill, and Laurita L. Hill. Raymond D’Aguilers Historia Francorum Ceperunt Iherusalem. 
(Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1968) 18, 27. 
25 Ibid., 31. 
26 Ibid., 35. Both accounts come from different points during the siege of Antioch 
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translations of both Raymond D’Aguilers’ and Peter Tudebode’s works highlight the fact that 
Tudebode has not infrequently been viewed as a plagiarist, taking the Gesta Francorum and 
adding elements of Raymond D’Aguilers’ work.27 However, while it is true that the three authors 
do seem similar in the content of their works, Tudebode is more than willing to contradict the 
others, especially where Bohemond, Raymond IV, and their respective merits are concerned. He 
makes little issue of how the crusaders razed Castoria, but rather than claiming it was for their 
refusing the crusaders use of the market, Tudebode claims the crusaders burned the city to kill 
the community of heretics within.28 Tudebode continues the trend of supporting the idea that the 
Crusade was a divine mission, but is not blind to the crusaders’ faults even if he offers 
justifications for some of them. 
The final remaining eyewitness this thesis utilizes is Fulcher of Chartres. Completing his 
work in 1127, Fulcher is the religious fanatic of the group, who interprets nearly every event he 
records as the proof of God’s intervention in the Crusade. One example of this is seen in his 
account of the crusaders’ naval passage from Brisindi. He writes of a shipwreck as follows,  
For among all these ships we saw one near the shore which suddenly cracked through the 
middle for no apparent reason. Consequently, four hundred of both sexes perished by 
drowning but concerning them joyous praise at once went up to God. For when those 
standing round about had collected as many bodies of the dead as possible, they found 
crosses actually imprinted in the flesh of some of them, between the shoulders.29  
 
He shares a similar penchant for description to Raymond D’Aguilers, at times providing 
specifics on the weapons and machines used by the crusaders, though as to their numerical 
strength, he greatly exaggerates.30 He seems to have taken at least a passing interest in the 
 
27 John H. Hill and Laurita L. Hill. Peter Tudebode: Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere. (Philadelphia, 
The American Philosophical Society, 1974) 4. 
28 Ibid., 25. 
29 Harold S. Fink. A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 1095-1127 Fulcher of Chartres (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company. 1969) 76. 




crusaders’ tactics and logistics, especially at Nicaea where he describes their usage of oxen to 
transport warships from the coast, over the mountains, to be deployed in the lake bordering the 
city. 
Crusader letters provide another source of eyewitness information as they were written by 
individuals present during the campaigns in the midst of the trials they faced. The letters served 
as a primary means by which the crusaders could communicate their experiences with 
correspondents, often family members or clergy, back home in Europe.31 Nine letters dating from 
June 1097- September of 1099 survive to relay information from the front lines of the conflict, 
each of which were drafted by Crusade leaders and priests.32 While they rarely speak of logistical 
considerations in direct terms, the letters do provide insight into some of the authors’ hopes, 
expectations, and sufferings during the campaign, all of which serve to show moments where 
they were or were not in possession of sufficient provisions.  
It is not enough, however, to rely solely on the Christian chroniclers and the crusaders’ 
letters. The story of the Crusades is not the sole concern of European historians. The Byzantine 
princess Anna Comnena, and Islamic chroniclers such as Ibn Al-Qalanisi recorded the Crusades 
as they interpreted the events from Byzantine and Islamic perspectives respectively. The Alexiad, 
completed by Anna Comnena in 1148, reveals many obstacles the crusaders faced in obtaining 
provisions as they travelled through Byzantine lands. One such obstacle was that of perception 
and reputation, as the Byzantines clearly recognized the armies as potential invaders in the best 
cases and as unruly belligerent mobs in the worst.33 From a Byzantine perspective, the crusaders 
 
31 Munro, Letters of the crusaders, 2. Munro maintains that all but two of the existing letters were drafted 
by the higher-rank crusaders, and all of them provide information inaccessible though other sources.  
32 Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate.  Letters from the East: crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th-13th 
Centuries (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010)1-11. 
33 Elizabeth A. S. Dawes. The Alexiad of the Princess Anna Comnena: Being the History of the Reign of 
Her Father, Alexius I, Emperor of the Romans, 1081-1118 A.D. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967) 258-9. 
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simultaneously represented a threat Emperor Alexius I would have to mitigate, and a logistical 
problem he would have to navigate, on account of the size of their forces, as he had to ferry them 
through Constantinople without them irreparably damaging his cities or countryside. While 
Alexius had requested military aid from western Europe to help reclaim territory lost to Muslim 
forces, the crusaders were not what he seems to have been expecting. Their sheer numbers 
coupled with the past conflicts between some Byzantine and Frankish nobles, meant that the 
crusaders had the potential to devastate the Byzantine countryside if left unchecked.34 The 
primary means by which Alexius could control the crusaders while they marched through his 
lands and camped outside Constantinople was through controlling their access to Byzantine 
provisions. This being the case, reputation and power politics became important factors 
influencing the crusaders’ logistical capabilities. 
Ibn Al-Qalanisi’s The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusade provides an alternate account 
of the Crusade as it reached the Middle East. It is an excerpt from a larger chronicle covering the 
period of time from 1056 to al-Qalanisi’s death in 1160, in which he addresses the crusaders’ 
arrival in the Middle East. At that time, he speaks of the political and military conflict between 
multiple Islamic factions vying for power in the region as a detriment to their defense of the 
region.35 In his writings on the crusaders, Ibn Al-Qalanisi is direct and concise, addressing their 
actions on the battlefield and during sieges, including commentary of the machinery employed, 
and the Muslim responses in kind. The crusaders and Muslims were held no delusions of being 
friendly, much less allied forces to one another, as the Franks had hoped the Byzantines would 
have been. As such, logistics became a battlefield unto themselves, with Ibn Al-Qalanisi citing 
 
34 Ibid., 258-60. 
35 Gibb, H. A. R. The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades: Extracted and translated from the chronicle of 
Ibn Al-Qalanisi. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1932) 14. 
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multiple occasions in which the Muslim armies sought to exploit the crusaders’ logistical 
inadequacies to their own advantage.36 The Christian chronicles, crusader letters, The Alexiad, 
and the Damascus Chronicle all reveal critical moments where the crusaders’ actions, trials, 
successes, and failures all rotated about an axis of logistical proficiency. The term axis is 
appropriate here because it refers to a central unifying structure about which dynamic elements 
move. As military action, success, and defeat are all dynamic states rather than static ones, and 
logistical proficiency, the degree of skill and ability one shows in procuring sufficient resources, 
influences each of them, it becomes the axis unifying each of them. 
In terms of historiographical analysis and influence, this thesis employs interdisciplinary 
works that span logistics, military planning, the Crusades, as well as some elements of 
environmental studies as they pertain to the crusaders’ food supply, specifically focused on 
drought, famine, aridity, and seasonal weather extremes. From a military perspective, the 
Crusades have received far more focus on the battles and leaders involved, as well as their 
religious and ideological belief, with logistics playing, at best, a supporting role to these 
overarching narratives. For example, in the words of John France, “It was indeed a hard training 
which produced coherent armies and ferocious fighters. It was this, their belief in God and 
themselves and their able commanders which gave them victory in the East.”37 These two 
sentences serve to summarize France’s underlying argument in Victory in the East, yet logistics 
or any reference to them fail to appear. However, logistics are indispensable when waging any 
extended campaign, especially one on foreign soil. Logistical concerns limited what the 
crusaders could realistically accomplish during their campaigns. They were limited by their 
capacity to transport supplies, burdened by the daily dietary needs of their people and animals, 
 
36 Ibid., 46-8. 
37 France. Victory in the East. 373. 
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vexed by political and economic factors influencing their access to local markets, and vulnerable 
to attack while marching through hostile lands.38 The environment in terms of weather, 
agricultural productivity, topography, and even the scars inflicted on the landscape by years of 
previous wars, influenced in some degree, each of the aforementioned logistical concerns, 
placing further limits on the crusaders’ potential logistical systems outside their ability to control. 
As the focus of this thesis is logistics, it is necessary to first address the limited attention 
logistics have received regarding the Crusades. This deficiency has been identified by both John 
A. Lynn and John H. Pryor, with the latter claiming that while “A considerable amount of 
attention has been devoted to military logistics in the classical and Early-Modern periods, but 
virtually none to military and naval logistics in the Middle Ages.”39 Of the two, Lynn’s survey 
addresses trends in the development of logistics from the Middle Ages through the Vietnam War, 
while Pryor’s addresses the Crusades specifically. The Middle Ages represent the point in time 
when military leaders began to attack their enemies’ provisions, seeking to weaken their forces 
before annihilating them on the field of battle.40 This is not to suggest that such tactics were 
newly developed in the Middle Ages, rather that they became an increasingly common practice, 
and a preferred method of victory. Pryor’s work consists of multiple papers presented at a 2002 
workshop addressing the logistical concerns of the Crusades ranging from food and equipment 
supplies, to harbors and naval resources, to roads, communications, maps, and money. In doing 
so his work helps fill in the historiographical gap surrounding the logistics of the Crusades. The 
contributing authors, amongst whom were included Pryor, John France, Bernard S. Bachrach, 
John Haldon, and Thomas F. Madden, share the primary concern of showing how logistical 
 
38 These are calculated in Chapter 1 with accompanying graphs from the sources used to find the necessary 
values. 
39 John H. Pryor. Logistics of Warfare in the Age of Crusades. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006) xi-xii. 
40 John A. Lynn. Feeding Mars (Boulder;San Francisco;Oxford: Westview Press, 1993) 34-35. 
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studies of the Crusades can be undertaken, and how they are essential to understanding the 
Crusades’ courses and outcomes.41 However, Pryor does admit the inherent difficulty in applying 
modern understandings of logistics to the Crusades, echoing one of France’s arguments 
regarding the problem of determining accurate numbers of crusaders from the primary sources, a 
problem common to all studies of medieval warfare.42 Furthermore, none of the studies represent 
a comprehensive look at the First Crusade overall, nor do they suggest logistics as a primary 
cause of victory. Rather, they identify, through smaller case studies, the minutia of different 
aspects of the crusaders’ logistical practices, including the use of roads, wagon trains, coinage, 
and the necessity of Byzantine shipping. As such they are invaluable resource to this study. Still, 
the story of the First Crusade requires a deeper logistical focus to be complete, one which 
addresses how multiple systems were utilized to feed and arm the crusader armies, and in doing 
so fuel their victory.  
As would be expected, given the nature of the crusaders’ expedition, the crusading armies 
would not be able to always rely on their productive systems in their various home regions. On 
the path to ultimate victory, the armies of the First Crusade experienced moments of both 
prosperity and suffering. The story is riddled throughout with periods of starvation and 
destitution resulting from the crusaders’ attempts to draw sustenance from marginal, heavily 
exploited, and even damaged environments that could not bear the load of thousands of 
additional people and animals traversing through them. It is a story that begins in drought, which 
was afflicting the soon-to-be crusaders, across class lines, as  Urban issued his call to liberate 
Jerusalem.43 In his 2013 book An Environmental History of the Middle Ages: The Crucible of 
 
41 Pryor, Logistics of Warfare in the Age of Crusades. 292. 
42 Ibid., 2. 
43 Levine. The Deeds of God. 41-2. 
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Nature, John Aberth addresses medieval thought regarding the environment, stating his belief 
that “the thousand years of medieval history from 500 to 1500 were among the most crucial for 
determining man’s future relationship with nature.”44 In doing so, he argues that dynamic periods 
of change in human attitudes towards the world around them were often the result of “ecological 
catastrophes” such as the Little Ice Age, the Black Death.45 His argument has a particular 
resonance in the history of the Crusades when one factors in the events in Europe immediately 
preceding the crusaders’ departure. In the five years preceding Clermont, the Franks, who would 
comprise a substantial portion of the crusaders’ overall forces, had experienced severe drought, 
and crop failures leading to uncertainty regarding their futures in their native lands. Aberth 
argues against full commitment to the notion that ecological stimuli are sufficient to explain 
dynamic human interactions, noting that economic, political, and cultural factors encouraged 
change in conjunction with environmental ones.46 Each of these factors must likewise be taken 
into consideration when addressing the reasons for the driving the crusaders to undertake their 
initial invasion. However, that the ecological crisis of 1090-1095 was the exception rather than 
the general state in Europe, and that Aberth’s claims over the importance of catastrophes in 
driving change have been challenged.47  
The story of the First Crusade is one of war, in which 60,000-80,000 combatants and 
non-combatants combined moved across European, Byzantine, and Middle Eastern lands. Their 
journey through these lands brought the crusaders into contact with various landscapes, each 
 
44 John Aberth. An Environmental History of the Middle Ages: The Crucible of Nature. (London: Routledge 
Ltd, 2013.) xiv. 
45 Ibid., xiv-xv. 
46 Ibid., 26-27. 
47 Most notably by Richard C. Hoffmann who argues that ecological changes prompted a multiplicity of 
response from Medieval people, not all of which resulted in invasions of foreign lands. Rather he argues, that 
ecological troubles were understood by farmers in medieval times and that they adapted their farming practices to 
compensate. An Environmental History of Medieval Europe. 125-6.  
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presenting different obstacles inhibiting their abilities to acquire provisions. In addition to the 
strain that the crusaders placed on the lands they travelled through, the environment, in terms of 
its climate, weather, and terrain, likewise placed a strain on the crusaders. As stated in Brian 
Allen Drake’s 2015 work on the American Civil War, “war may be waged in the name of politics 
and ideology, but it is fought by bodies moving through space.”48 This suggests that in the study 
of warfare, the conditions of the bodies, including hydration, nourishment, mass, and numbers, 
and the factors presented the space through which they move and fight, such as terrain, weather, 
and temperature, are important considerations. Drake’s work suggests that balance of power 
between these two forces is shown to favor the space rather than the bodies.49 The environment’s 
influence over the course of battle extends well beyond the battlefield, including the days, weeks, 
and even months preceding an engagement as the people are subject to the conditions through 
which they march and set up camp. While issues of drought, aridity, and topography presented 
environmental challenges to the crusaders’ logistical systems, these systems could likewise be 
bolstered by bounteous harvests. However, the crusaders also had to contend with the fact that 
the landscape, in terms of its carrying capacity and terrain, had been acted upon by the various 
Islamic factions in response to the crusaders’ arrival for the purpose of inhibiting their ability to 
invade the region. Unable to transport sufficient food and fodder to satisfy the full caloric 
requirements of their armies, the crusaders were forced to take from the land, which could not 
produce during droughts, making it difficult to maintain a robust fighting force for an extended 
period.   
Studies of medieval logistics are complicated by the fact that it is very difficult to 
determine from the primary sources how many people actually went on these armed pilgrimages. 
 
48 Brian Allen Drake. The Blue, the Gray, and the Green. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015) 48. 
49 Ibid., 226-7. 
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However, historians have tried to compensate for this problem by employing multidisciplinary 
approaches. The 2011-2012 article by John Haldon et al. entitled “Marching across Anatolia: 
Medieval Logistics and Modeling the Mantzikert Campaign,” represents one such study, though 
it refers to a campaign which shortly precedes the First Crusade. Combining the efforts of 
historians, archaeologists, and computer scientists, the study set out to establish the range of 
possibilities for the size of the armies at Mantzikert in 1071. The research teams addressed roads, 
carrying capacity of pack animals, caloric requirements of humans and animals alike, available 
machinery for transportation, and the 24-day maximum time period within which transported 
supplies could be used in addition to estimates of maximum crop yields, range over which 
foraging parties can stray from the main army, and even population data concerning the areas 
which the campaigning armies passed through, all to establish models for estimating the greatest 
possible numbers of combatants the armies could muster.50 The results suggest that even 
conservative estimates on the size of the armies carried a heavy burden on the land, and further 
emphasize the environment’s influence on logistics by addressing the effect terrain has on 
mobility and transportive capability.51 Using such data, this thesis will seek to more accurately 
determine how many people could have been provisioned on the journey and in doing so, better 
understand why provisioning remained a relatively consistent problem for the crusaders. 
This opens up questions regarding the beleaguered fighting force, namely who, or more 
specifically, what, was a crusader? A crusader, as they would have understood themselves from 
Urban’s preaching, was an armed pilgrim, preferably a wealthy, heavily-armed-and-armored, 
mounted knight from amongst the nobility, on a divine mission to liberate the Holy Land from 
 
50 John Haldon et al. “Marching across Anatolia: Medieval Logistics and Modeling the Mantzikert 
Campaign.” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 65-6, (2011-2) 217. 
51 Ibid., 225. 
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the enemies of God. The crusaders believed themselves to be embarking on a form of 
pilgrimage, one which included military and settlement components.52 These factors created a 
cultural movement that promoted both warfare and settlement, such as the colonization of the 
Holy Land, but placed requirements on the religious community, the local lords, and the families 
of the crusaders to support these pilgrimages. Of these factors, Riley-Smith suggests, that 
lordship and kinship pressures were most influential in motivating potential crusaders to action 
because they carried not only the cultural pressures of living up to one’s familial heritage, but 
also because they offered a degree of aid in the practical aspects of preparation for the journey, 
namely potentially vast sources of wealth and manpower.53  
As a concept, a crusader was oxymoronic, especially in the eyes of Byzantine observers, 
who saw armies of belligerents rather than groups of penitents.54 The crusaders were expected 
and instructed to perform their military function in the service of God against His enemies, an 
obligation which necessitated they be armed.55 Pilgrims, by contrast, were expected to be 
unarmed, wearing simple clothes and travelling with nothing but bare essentials and some money 
for the road.56 These seemingly mutually exclusive roles resulted in conflict as the crusaders 
sought to use their roles as pilgrims to rely on Christian charity, while external observers, 
recognizing armies on sight, felt no obligation to offer knights, soldiers, and especially not 
perceived rioters, those courtesies entitled to pilgrims. 
 
52 Jonathan Riley-Smith. The First Crusaders, 1095-1131. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 189. 
53 Ibid., 130. 
54 Dawes, The Alexiad, 252-3. 
55 Sweetenham, Robert the Monk. 80-1. 
56 William Melczer. The Pilgrim's Guide to Santiago De Compostela. (New York: Italica Press, 1993) 132-
3. Pilgrims were entitled to ask for charity in the form of food and lodging while on the road. Upon receiving such 
requests, medieval Christians denied such requests at great personal risk, opening themselves to divine retribution 
for their refusal to care for the penitents.   
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The first chapter of this thesis concerns the preparatory phase of the First Crusade, from 
Clermont in 1095 to Nicaea in early 1097. This chapter will address the identities of the 
crusaders as well as the regions of Europe they departed from, the people and animals involved 
in the journey, the sources for provisions available for collection and transportation, and the 
challenges posed to provisioning by issues surrounding water and weather. During this 
preparatory phase, the ill-fated “People’s Crusade” was undertaken by Peter the Hermit. This 
was the first of two waves to be addressed, and its ultimate failure can be seen as one born from 
overzealous and rushed preparations by a religious leader inexperienced in the ways of war. By 
framing the preparatory phase between the Council of Clermont and the departure from Nicaea 
in 1097, the events within occur completely in European and Byzantine contexts, establishing the 
crusaders’ abilities to provision their armies when they possessed familiar and orderly logistical 
systems to support their armies. From a logistical perspective, the siege of Nicaea represents the 
crusaders’ greatest triumph with the armies accomplishing a feat that would not be replicated in 
the remainder of the campaign, namely the transport of ships over mountains to blockade the 
city. 
The second chapter concerns the march from Nicaea in 1097 through the Middle East to 
the hard-fought crusader victory in the siege of Antioch in 1098. This period was a transitional 
phase for the crusaders as they moved away from both their native region and source of military 
resources, and the economic and military infrastructure of the Byzantine Empire. This chapter 
will address the Middle Eastern landscape as well as its history preceding the crusaders’ arrival 
in the region, namely the wars and turmoil caused by the shifting power struggles amongst 
Islamic powers. It was during this transitional phase that the authors of the First Crusade 
narratives mark the crusaders’ greatest struggles with food supply, and provisioning, both 
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occurring at the siege of Antioch. At Antioch, the crusaders suffered from starvation brought 
about from the Syrian winter, which isolated them from previously captured cities, effectively 
restricting their supply lines. This was a logistical failing, though it was due to factors largely 
beyond their control. However, despite the starvation and suffering which made the siege such a 
harrowing experience for the crusaders, their victories over both the besieged forces at Antioch, 
and the later forces brought by Kerbogha were the result of a superior understanding of both their 
logistical capabilities and the threat presented by Kerbogha’s use of siege tactics against them.  
The final chapter addresses the final stages of the First Crusade during which the 
crusaders claim ultimate victory, capturing Jerusalem in a siege that took six weeks, rather than a 
number of months, in 1099. Between the siege of Antioch and the siege of Jerusalem, the 
crusaders faced tremendous starvation at Ma’arrat, and the crusader army separated into two 
factions, which reunited at the siege of Arqah in March of 1099. The first faction was led by 
Raymond IV, the second by Godfrey of Bouillon and Robert of Flanders. Of the two sets of 
leaders, Raymond IV exhibited a dynamic shift in his approach to logistics in their march south, 
relying more on his skills as a diplomat than as a military commander. In the wake of the siege of 
Ma’arrat, Raymond IV had to rebuild his weakened army in potentially hostile territory, without 
the support of familiar logistical systems. Once the factions reunited at Arqah, they continued 
south along the coast, enjoying the benefits of maritime trade in the Mediterranean. From Arqah, 
their march south to Jerusalem was peaceful in comparison to the previous sieges and 
skirmishes. In their final victory at Jerusalem, the crusaders’ received aid from Genoa in the 
form of six ships which carried food, lumber and skilled labor sufficient to simplify the final 




CHAPTER 1: PREPARATION: From Clermont 1095 to Nicaea 1097 
 
When Urban preached the First Crusade at Clermont in 1095 and subsequently at other 
cities throughout western and southern France, his sermon was spread across France and 
Germany to all classes, from the nobility to the peasantry, calling for Jerusalem’s liberation. As 
Baldric of Bourgueil records,  
The council was dissolved, and every one of us hurried to return homewards. The bishops 
were preaching, and the laymen were now proclaiming the same message loudly and 
outspokenly. The word of God was spread…57  
 
When the bishops and laypeople carried the Pope’s call across Christendom, the result was a 
four-year campaign in which European Christians travelled from western France, Germany, and 
Italy, through the Byzantine capital of Constantinople and into the Middle East, ultimately 
capturing the city of Jerusalem in 1099.  
The origins of their success lay in the preparations the crusaders’ leaders made well 
before arriving at their destination. Before they could invade the Middle East, with the goal of 
liberating Jerusalem, the crusaders had to successfully transport thousands of knights, soldiers, 
non-combatants, animals, provisions, weaponry, and armor to Constantinople. Their activities in 
this endeavor help to identify the first, and longest, of three phases of the First Crusade from a 
logistical perspective. This phase encompasses the years between the 1095 Council of Clermont 
and the conclusion of the siege of Nicaea in 1097. During the first phase of the Crusade, the 
crusaders would have the logistical boons of a familiar landscape and systems to rely on for 
supplies, as well as the Byzantine Empire’s infrastructure, serving at the pleasure of Emperor 
Alexius I, with its roads, markets and shipping. More importantly, the crusaders were in 
 
57 Susan B. Edgington, Baldric of Bourgueil “History of the Jerusalemites”: A Translation of the Historia 
Ierosolmitana. (New York: The Boydell Press, 2020), 50-1.   
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primarily friendly, or at the very least allied lands, without the constant threat of hostile 
interference against their supply trains and foraging parties.58 As will be made evident, these 
boons did not guarantee success on their own, but they could be useful tools aiding the crusaders 
in the early stage when used as such. For the two waves of crusaders departing Europe in 1096, 
this initial stage of preparation was critical in determining their success, or lack thereof, in 
invading the Middle East. These waves of crusaders met drastically different fates after departing 
Constantinople, each occurring as the result of their planning and preparations before departure.  
In any age, logistics and military planning encompass a broad range of considerations.59 
Among them, environmental context plays a significant role in influencing how logistical 
planning can progress. In order for armies to be rallied and remain strong, they have to be fed. 
To understand how the crusaders handled logistics, it is necessary to consider the medieval 
agricultural systems which produced the food supply available to them. By the Middle Ages, 
Richard C. Hoffmann argues that medieval people understood their local environmental 
conditions, including soil type and seasonal wetness and aridity, to such a degree that between 
800 and 1300 CE they began adapting their agricultural practices to seasonal climatic trends in 
order to maximize their productive capacity, while increasing concentration in cereal grains 
including wheat, rye, barley, and oats.60 During this period he argues that people in southern and 
Mediterranean Europe developed a system of two-course crop rotation, which, while allowing 
fields to lie fallow during dry summer months, resulting in higher annual crop yields per hectare 
 
58 For the most part, so long as the crusaders stayed peaceful in the European lands through which they 
marched, they did not have to worry about having their supply lines raided. However, where they acted in hostility 
to their hosts, be it through actual attack or unwelcome forage, leaders such as Coloman of Hungary and Alexius I 
would respond in kind.    
59 As stated in the introduction, for the purposes of this thesis “logistics” refers to the systems and processes 
for moving the necessary equipment, supplies, provisions, and people for military operations. Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
1812 invasion of Russia, covered next chapter, serves as a further elaboration on the importance of logistics outside 
the Middle Ages.   
60 Hoffmann. An Environmental History of Medieval Europe. 133. 
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cultivated than previous practices.61 This he contrasts with northern and western practices, which 
benefited from heavier soils capable of retaining moisture year-round. In these regions, three-
course crop rotation allowed for plots of land to be cultivated two years out of three rather than 
every other year.62 The rise of cereal regimes was, in part, due to cultural significance and 
pressure from the nobility, who favored wheat for personal consumption, but also in response to 
the increased use of draft animals, primarily oxen and horses the latter of which required grains, 
like oats, for fodder.63 Under this pressure, cereal grains were the primary source of calories, 
especially among the impoverished who relied on barley, rye, and oats. In the first phase of the 
Crusade, both regimes would be important as even though the crusaders originated from 
primarily France and Germany, their routes to Constantinople carried them either through 
Hungary in the case of Godfrey and the People’s Crusade, or through Mediterranean lands.64 
Operating under stable conditions, these regimes helped to fuel economic and population growth 
throughout the High Middle Ages.  
With the systems of production established, it is time to address systems of 
transportation, and with them, numbers. In order to properly address the crusaders’ logistical 
proficiency, it is first necessary to estimate, the size of the force their logistical systems had to 
support. Fortunately, the maximum size of the crusader armies is a topic that has been addressed 
by historians, with numbers having been estimated from as low as 30,000 in total to 100,000 on 
the upper end.65 In Victory in the East, John France argues that the maximum reasonable size for 
the crusader forces would be in the range of 50,000-60,000, including combatants and 
 
61 Ibid., 125-126. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 124. 
64 Bohemond is the exception to the general trend, as he was in Italy when he learned of the Crusade. 
65 Pryor. Logistics of Warfare, 49.  
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noncombatants alike.66 Of the total forces, he estimates no more than 7,000 to have been knights 
in full, but that this group would have started with an initial 20,000 horses, divided between 
warhorses, palfreys, and pack-horses, for which they would have brought a “substantial army” of 
grooms and retainers to see to their care.67 To this he adds 20,000 participants in People’s 
Crusade making the total number of people travelling to Asia Minor in the order of 70,000-
80,000, though the fact that the People’s Crusade was destroyed before the second wave even 
arrived in Constantinople, means that their contribution to the maximum size of the army is 
negligible. He places crusader losses at Nicaea at approximately 10,000, and of the remainder, 
only 30,000 arrived at the walls of Antioch in 1097 as estimated by Jonathan Riley-Smith.68 
30,000 is the only number Riley-Smith gives as to the total strength of the crusaders’ forces, 
seemingly leading Bachrach to suggest that this was Riley-Smith’s estimation for their maximum 
strength overall.69 However, he just states that 30,000 was the approximate size of the force that 
reached Antioch. As it unreasonable to believe that the crusaders would have been able to 
weather the siege of Nicaea, Kilij Arslan’s attack at Dorylaeum, and the march to Antioch 
without sustaining at least some casualties, it is equally unreasonable to suggest that 30,000 
represented the First crusaders’ maximum strength. For these reasons, France’s estimates of 
60,000 crusaders combatants and non-combatants alike, 10,000 of whom would not survive 
Nicaea, and 7,000 of whom were knights will be used as the crusaders’ maximum strength for 
the purposes of this thesis. 
 
66 France. Victory in the East. 142. France’s numbers are based on a count of the crusaders, numbering 
20,000 taken as they left from Laodicea at the Crusade’s conclusion, numbers which he concedes “may have 
represented a pardonable exaggeration,” and applying a 3:1 ratio of loss, born of the trials and attritions they faced in 
the course of the journey. Historians such as Bernard S. Bachrach have suggested that France’s numbers are on the 
conservative side, yet Bachrach has used France’s numbers on more than one occasion, indicating that even as a 
conservative estimate, it is still a considerable force and is not unreasonable. 
67 Ibid., 126. 
68 Ibid. Riley-Smith. The Crusades. 37.  
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The crusader leaders had three main methods they could utilize to meet the task of 
feeding 60,000 people and the animals they brought with them. The favored method would be 
foraging or pillaging for their needs from enemy lands, as it allowed the armies to 
simultaneously sustain themselves while harming their enemies.70 However, to avoid 
antagonizing their allies or bring damaging their own landholdings, this method would have to 
wait until the crusaders reached Muslim-held lands.  
A second method the crusaders sought to employ was to purchase additional provisions 
as they passed through different regions on their campaign.71 Money was one of the more 
important resources medieval commanders had to allocate, and purchasing food was one of the 
primary reasons why. However, purchase required two external conditions to be met. First, it 
required the consent of city leaders, who had to be pacified by the armies’ leaders. Second the 
cities had to have food available for purchase. As the People’s Crusade found in their march to 
Constantinople, failure to recognize or satisfy these conditions could lead to unnecessary and 
devastating hostilities. 
The final method of feeding their armies involved the transportation of food with the 
army as it moved. Food and supplies could be transported by three basic mechanics: wheels, 
hooves, and feet. In a logistical study on the campaign preceding the Battle of Manzikert in 
1071, Haldon et al. calculated the dietary needs and carrying capacity of eleventh-century horses 
and pack animals. Their data is shown below in Figure 1. Pasturage would obviously not have to 
be transported, however, the dietary needs of a single horse added 9.2 kilograms of food and 30 
 
70 John Clarke, De Re Militari: The Classic Treatise on Warfare at the Pinnacle of the Roman Empire’s 
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liters of water per day, to that which had to be satisfied for the army to remain at fighting 
strength.72 
 
Figure 1 Chart of Dietary Requirements and Carrying Capacity. Image from Haldon et. al. “Marching Across Anatolia.” 216. 
Furthermore, while it need not be transported, the necessary pasturage presented its own 
challenges in terms of both logistics and tactics. From a logistical perspective it required the 
knights to find locations capable of providing the needed grasses to make camp, an issue which 
influenced the tactical problem. Keeping the cavalry grouped too close to their main forces 
threatened medieval armies with starvation. By contrast, dispersing the cavalry to graze as 
necessary weakened the overall strength of the army, leaving them vulnerable to an easy defeat 
 
72 For each knight, this comes to an additional 27.6 kilograms of food and 90 liters of water necessary for 
their animals alone, given that they started their campaign a minimum of three horses each. 
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by the enemy.73 This would become more of an issue as the crusaders moved into the Middle 
East.  
Multiplying the daily food requirement of a single horse by the established minimum of 
20,000 horses used by the knights, this comes to 552,000 kilograms, or 552 metric tons of food, 
and 475,510 gallons of water on a daily basis.74 As for human requirements, Bachrach and Pryor 
both suggest that a daily ration of 1 kilogram of food, usually bread of some form as it was easy 
to transport, would have been standard in most armies, adding 60 metric tons to the daily food 
requirement for the armies.75 The resulting 612 metric tons of food daily can then be multiplied 
by between 14 and 17 days, the range of maximum time food could safely be stored for 
consumption during travel to arrive at between 8,568 and 10,404 metric tons of food necessary 
for just the people and horses before having to resupply. Supposing they could utilize exclusively 
the 4-wheeled carts to transport just their food and none of their money, armor, weapons or 
lumber, the wagon trains would include between 8,568 and 10,404 wagons, and twice that range 
of oxen to pull it. As it stands, this does not account for the requirements of the pack animals, 
and the crusaders could not use only ox-carts to transport their necessities, but it does show the 
enormity of the crusaders’ task.  
Producing the colossal amounts of food which the crusaders needed would have been a 
Herculean task in optimal agricultural conditions. However, the environmental conditions in 
France which influenced agricultural yields during the five years preceding the Council of 
Clermont were neither optimal, nor even stable. Only two of the chroniclers, Guibert of Nogent, 
 
73 John France. Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999) 
10. 
74 Haldon et. al. “Marching Across Anatolia.” 216-9. 
75 Bernard S. Bachrach. “Some Observations on the Role of the Byzantine Navy in the Success of the First 
Crusade.” Journal of Medieval Military History: Volume I (New York: Boydell and Brewer, 2002) 89. Pryor. 
Logistics of Warfare, 19. 
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and Robert the Monk, deemed it relevant to address, even in passing, the ecological crisis which 
that plagued France from 1090 through 1095. Of the two, Robert only mentions the crisis 
tangentially, claiming that Urban II’s sermon at Clermont exhorted the Franks to:  
not be held back by any possession or concern for your family. For the land you 
inhabit… cannot support your sheer numbers: it is not overflowing with abundant riches 
and indeed provides scarcely enough food even for those who grow it.76  
 
The Franks suffered five years of summertime droughts, torrential winter rains, and 
uncharacteristically high mortality, culminating with a particularly devastating drought in 1095.77 
Guibert of Nogent provides more detail regarding the effects of this drought, writing:  
At this time there was a general famine, with great poverty among even the very wealthy, 
since when even though there were enough things, here and there, for sale for some 
people they had nothing or scarcely anything with which those things could be bought. 
Masses of poor people learned to feed often on the roots of wild plants since they were 
compelled by the scarcity of bread to search everywhere for some possible substitute.78 
  
The drought brought scarcity and economic ruin along all social classes. As could be expected, 
the poor were the most affected by the food shortages, being forced to scavenge “the roots of 
wild plants” since the grain crops had failed.79 To medieval European Christians, such a 
devastating drought was understood to have but one cause, divine punishment levied against a 
sinful world. As sin was a religious problem, it required a religious solution to bring about an 
end to the suffering. At Clermont, Urban presented a solution.  
Urban’s call to Crusade was delivered to a suffering European flock. As the droughts 
were viewed as a divine punishment, medieval Christians would have held that one recourse 
 
76 Sweetenham. Robert the Monk’s History. 80.  
77 Philip Slavin. “crusaders in Crisis: Towards the Re-Assessment of the Origins and Nature of the 
“People’s Crusade” of 1095-1096” Imago temporis: medium Aevum 4 (2010): 176-87 Jonathan Riley-Smith. The 
First crusaders 1095-1131 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1997) 16. Slavin argues that this crisis was a 
product of climate change during a transitional period between the Late Antique Little Ice Age and the Medieval 
Climate Optimum.  




existed for salvation, penance.80 A chance for penance is what Urban was offering, remission for 
sins of those who left Europe to liberate Jerusalem. With the promise of spiritual salvation, he 
included an idea of physical salvation by associating Jerusalem with the “land flowing with milk 
and honey.”81 Urban delivered a starving and desperate population with a means to escape their 
suffering, and guarantee their eternal salvation all in one fell swoop.82 Under such conditions, it 
is unsurprising that one response to the call was a religious fervor that overlooked the careful 
military planning necessary to be successful in a prolonged campaign. As will be made evident 
later, this is but a contributing factor, in the abject failure of the People’s Crusade. 
The departure date was set for August 15, 1096 and members of the nobility, clergy, and 
peasantry in regions such as Normandy, Provence, and Flanders began to prepare in varying 
extents for a Holy War. For the crusaders who intended to fight in the Holy Land, the first 
objective they had to accomplish was the successful arrival at the Byzantine capital of 
Constantinople, armies intact. This meant that not only would they have to rally and provision 
armies for the cause, but that Emperor Alexius I would have to be ready for their arrival.  
The nobility and military elite understood that the campaign they were about to undertake 
would require considerable wealth and preparation to end in success.83 In his typical elitist 
fashion, Guibert lauds the nobility in taking their time to secure sufficient funding, scorning the 
People’s haste by contrast. Meanwhile, Robert suggests that Raymond IV of St Gilles, whom he 
 
80 Slavin, “crusaders in Crisis:” 192. This belief derives from an extension of the medieval idea of the Great 
Chain of Being in combination with medieval theological teachings on penance being necessary to atone for sins. In 
short, since God created everything and made his will manifest through the natural world, his judgement for sins 
could, and would be shown through natural phenomena, meaning that said phenomena could be influenced through 
penitent acts. 
81 Sweetenham. Robert the Monk’s History. 81. 
82 Ibid. Levine, The Deeds of God, 41-2., Edgington, Albert of Aachen’s history, 16. Taken together these 
works, in order, identify the drought as a problem, show the desperation felt by wealthy and poor alike, and suggest 
repentance specifically as a motivation for joining with Peter the Hermit and the People’s Crusade.   
83 Levine, The Deeds of God, 42. Sweetenham, Robert the Monk, 90.  
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identifies as the wealthiest amongst the crusaders’ leaders, “sold all he owned” in preparation of 
the coming campaign. While Robert’s choice of wording regarding Raymond’s actions is an 
obvious hyperbole, the fact that the wealthiest of the leaders, which Raymond is attested to have 
been in primary as well as secondary works, would have had to go to such lengths to finance his 
operation suggests that the financial cost of Crusading was immense.84  
In preparation for the Crusade, the participants had to deal with the anticipated cost of 
undertaking a pilgrimage, increased by the cost incurred by the need for arms, armor, and 
horses.85 As seen previously, one massive problem the crusaders faced was the fact that the 
caloric needs of their armies were increased by the presence of their elite forces, heavily armored 
knights on horseback. It was not unusual for medieval armies to incur such burdens, however, 
the additional necessary food brought additional financial cost. In his estimations on the crusader 
armies’ full size, France argues that even the poorest among the knights rallied would have set 
out on the journey with a minimum of three horses as part of their entourage, including a destrier 
for combat, a palfrey for non-combat transportation, and a pack horse to transport their 
belongings.86 In addition they would have brought along the grooms, servants, squires and 
retainers necessary to see to the upkeep of their animals and belongings, who could, if necessary, 
bear arms and fight.87  
In order ensure their armies’ robust arrival on Alexius’ doorstep, the Crusade leaders 
would have to store up food, raise funds, and decide on their routes to Constantinople. They were 
met with varying degrees of success in this regard. The leaders of the “Princes’ Crusade,” 
 
84 Robert is intentionally referencing Acts 4:32-5 where the early Christians were recorded to have sold 
their lands and houses and presented the proceeds to the Apostles, to further highlight the crusaders’ piety 
85 France, Victory in the East, 87-100. France argues that while the costs of pilgrimages were reasonably 
well known, costing at least a year’s income, the cost of crusading was more difficult to estimate, owing to the 
additional money princes needed to support armies and preserve their social status during the journey.   




considered the bulk of the crusading armies, were comprised of seasoned veterans from the 
nobility including Hugh of Vermandois, Bohemond of Taranto, Godfrey the Duke of Lorraine, 
Raymond of Toulousse, Adhemar the Bishop of Le Puy, Robert of Normandy, Stephen the 
Count of Blois, and Robert the Count of the Flemings.88 In addition to this main force of 
crusaders, was the 20,000-strong People’s Crusade led by Peter the Hermit, a preacher who had 
been stopped in his previous attempted pilgrimage to Jerusalem by Islamic forces, and was one 
of the First Crusade’s most fervent supporters.89 From the time these leaders spent in preparation, 
two facts become obvious. The leaders of the main force, having previous experience in military 
affairs, understood the magnitude of the journey ahead of them and the necessary preparations 
they would have to make prior to departure, whilst Peter did not.90 Furthermore, they were able 
to maintain discipline over their forces when travelling in foreign lands, whereas Peter lacked the 
leadership necessary to control the mass of peasants following him.  
The first group to take up the cross was the People’s Crusade which started in April of 
1096. This group of crusaders was doomed to fail from the beginning. Peter the Hermit was a 
popular preacher amongst the laity in Northern France and Germany, able to capitalize on and 
feed the religious zeal of the people rallying a great horde of believers to the cause.91 He was not 
a seasoned veteran with years of military experience. He led a mob, not an army. Furthermore, 
zealotry does nothing to satiate physical hunger pangs. His lack of experience in military affairs 
is shown by the lack of care he took in preparing, as well as the speed with which he departed. At 
the very least, he seems to have been able to raise some amount of money with which he planned 
 
88 Fink. A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem. 72-3. Like many of his fellow chroniclers, Fulcher often 
uses “princes” as a generic term in reference to the nobility on the Crusade. Godfrey is also called Godfrey of 
Bouillon 
89 Dawes. The Alexiad. 248. 
90 Levine. The Deeds of God. 42-48. 
91 Ibid., 42-3. Sweetenham. Robert the Monk’s History. 83. Dawes, The Alexiad, 248-50. 
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to purchase food, but money alone was not sufficient for the task he was about to undertake.92 As 
a minister, he was unlikely to have learned military training or education that would address 
these nuances of warfare. Departing in April 1096 left the People’s Crusade with only seven 
months to complete their preparations. Of that time, Peter the Hermit spent the early stages 
acquiring permission to lead the Crusade, rallying the masses behind him, and making his way to 
Cologne, leaving himself only eight days for him to make his final purchases, during which time 
European withered under a drought.93  
Peter the Hermit was a student of the Bible, not De Re Militari. It is, perhaps, unfair to 
judge him by the standards of the other Crusade leaders as he lacked their experience in military 
affairs. Peter the Hermit could not have been expected to succeed. His Crusade was conceived in 
panic caused by an ecological crisis, and fueled by religious zeal. He was a preacher, attempting 
to lead a military campaign without any of the experience or logistical acumen to see it 
completed, making him incapable of controlling his forces. When the people lost control and 
attacked the Hungarians, Peter found himself involved in battles over provisions which cost him 
forces he could not afford to lose, and ultimately the provisions and money he had gained. 
Depleted by repeated conflicts, his army arrived in the Byzantine capital weak. When the 
People’s Crusade continued in their belligerent actions, Alexius banished them. Because Peter 
was unable to plan their campaign appropriately, the People’s Crusade never made it past Asia 
Minor.  
 
92 Edgington. Albert of Aachen’s history. 18-21. This information comes by way of inference, as it is 
recorded that he possessed a cache of gold and silver prior to his arrival in Hungary, later to be lost in battle with the 
Hungarians, with which he planned to purchase food from local markets with the blessings of the Hungarian king, 
Coloman.  
93 Ibid., 16-21. Pryor. Logistics of Warfare. 121-2. Riley-Smith. The Crusades, 26-8. 
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The nobles who led the second wave of crusaders out of Europe, however did possess the 
knowledge and experience sufficient to succeed. Most were seasoned veterans, well aware that 
the liberation of the Jerusalem, like any extended campaign, would require money, supplies, 
soldiers, knights, and time in order to succeed. In addition to the material components, the 
princes also had to determine means and routes of travel. Figure 2, shown below, depicts the four 
primary routes taken by the Franks to arrive in Constantinople. Of note, Godfrey of Bouillon’s 
route was the same utilized by the People’s Crusade earlier in 1096, sending him straight through 
Hungary mere months after the belligerent mob.  
1096 turned out to be a pivotal year for the Franks in their preparations. The droughts 
came to an end, resulting in incredible agricultural yields from the summer harvests throughout 
France and Germany.94 The end of the drought was more significant to the leaders than simply 
providing the necessary food supply to support their armies. It brought with it the money 
necessary to fund the endeavor. Food and weaponry were not the only items for which the 
Crusade leaders needed money. In Victory in the East, John France suggests that while on 
campaign, the princes had to maintain their status as “masters of men” through displays of 
personal wealth.95 This included not only allocating funds to provide for the inevitable 
noncombatants that would follow the army simply to make the pilgrimage, but also reimbursing 
the knights who lost their horses in the course of the campaign.96 This benefitted the princes as it 
allowed them to store and transport a greater percentage of their food, relying less on the 
 
94 Fink. A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem. 72. Riley-Smith. The Crusades. 28. 
95 France suggests that the crusade leaders were aware of the inevitability of their marches attracting 
attention. He claims the leaders knew they would be surrounded not only by their own respective entourages, but 
also by any poorer pilgrims who might attach themselves to the group or that the leaders would choose to support in 
their journey. The crusade leaders’ wealth would be the factor which allowed them to support these additional 
people and maintain their social status over them through a physical medium.  
96 France. Victory in the East. 254-5. 
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markets. This is not to suggest they did not seek to purchase food as necessary, though when 
they did, they met with little resistance.97 
 
Figure 2: The Routes to Constantinople. Image from Victory in the East by John France, page 89. 
The care with which the nobles undertook their preparations is indicative of their 
understanding of contemporary military tactics and strategy. The De Re Militari, a fourth century 
Roman text, serves as the only authority on formal understandings of strategy in the medieval 
west.98 Walter Goffart suggests that before 1284, the treatise had been translated five separate 
 
97 Edgington. Albert of Aachen’s history. 47. 
98 C. W. C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1953) 33. 
Walter Goffart. “The Date and Purpose of Vegetius' 'De Re Militari'.” Traditio 33 (1977): 65-6. This occurrence 
within the West is contrasted by the comparative multitude of Byzantine works regarding warfare and strategy, and 
contributes to the reputation of the Middle Ages existing as a “dark” age in the West.  
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times into the French alone, in addition to German, English, and Italian.99 As such it outlines 
everything Western European nobles and military commanders, like those who led the crusaders, 
would have known about preparing for war. However, none of the chroniclers even suggest that 
the crusade leaders had knowledge of this treatise, as none of the leaders’ military training or 
even possible education is even mentioned. While it is unclear whether or not the crusader 
leaders had formal education in De Re Militari, the fact remains that with few exceptions, the 
crusade leaders’ methods, strategy, and tactics in their approach to the First Crusade, match those 
outlined by Vegetius.100  
Vegetius maintains that victory through famine was the easiest and most preferred means 
of destroying one’s enemies.101 The siege is the practical incarnation of this tactic applied against 
a fortified position, and siege warfare seems to have been both the crusaders’ preferred tactic, 
and the one they were most proficient in utilizing. Why should they risk their armies or the 
people who travelled with them when they could win inevitable wars of attrition by starving 
besieged enemies? In siege warfare, victory through famine comes by means of blockading the 
defenders within their city and waiting until they run out of provisions. However, the inherent 
risk of a siege is that the besieging army can also fall victim to the threat of famine.102 This threat 
is made worse if the defending armies utilize scorched earth tactics in preparation for a siege, 
seeking to deprive the besieging army of necessary resources.103 Taken together these points 
indicate that siege warfare is heavily influenced not only by logistics but also by environmental 
 
99 Goffart. “The Date and Purpose.” 65. 
100 The similarities in the crusade leaders’ tactics and methods, and Vegetius’ writing could be the result of 
practical experience and common military practice over formal training. However, regardless of the origins of these 
similarities, they do exist, and as such De Re Militari remains an important source for understanding the leaders’ 
actions and the possible motivations behind them  
101 Clarke, De Re Militari. 65-9.  
102 Ibid., 69.  
103 The crusaders would face the threat of famine at the siege of Antioch in 1097-8, scorched earth tactics in 
the form of defiled wells at Jerusalem in 1099.  
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factors such as topography, and availability of food and water. Vegetius further advised 
marching in the fall and spring months, though suggested that if armies must march through the 
summer or winter the commanders had to make certain considerations regarding equipment and 
timing as to avoid taxing their armies through exposure to elemental extremes.104 Ensuring the 
strength and wellbeing of their armies was of utmost importance for being victorious in a lengthy 
campaign. However, the crusaders were not able to follow every tenet of the De Re Militari. 
Vegetius cautions against the rallying of massive armies, as they are both difficult to supply and 
made vulnerable by the bulk and sluggishness of their supply lines.105  
In sharp contrast to the People’s Crusade, the nobles all successfully arrived at 
Constantinople with the bulk of their forces intact, since they did not have to attack or pillage 
their hosts along the way to prevent starvation. They did not all leave Europe, nor arrive at the 
Byzantine Empire simultaneously, a byproduct of their preparations and the events of their 
journeys, but they did so successfully because they were careful and prepared. For the most part, 
it was only with their arrival in the Byzantine Empire that the nobles faced any trouble on the 
road. Their troubles at this stage were due to how their forces were perceived by the Byzantine 
Emperor. 
It was the oldest and wealthiest of the Frankish nobles, Raymond IV of St. Gilles, then 
around 55 years old, who showed the greatest care in his preparations.106 Departing from Le Puy 
in October 1096, Raymond led the largest body of crusaders along the longest route arriving in 
Constantinople on April 21, 1097.107 The route he chose was entirely landlocked, sending his 
 
104 Clarke. De Re Militari, 67-8. 
105 Ibid., 65. 
106 His preparations would pay off in the later stages of the Crusade, addressed in Chapter 3, where he 
becomes a primary focus. 
107 Riley-Smith, The Crusades. 32. 
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army marching through the mountains of northern Italy and Bulgaria to cover almost 3100 
kilometers in a seven-month journey. His journey was only slightly longer in terms of distance 
than Robert of Normandy’s when accounting for the latter’s crossing the Adriatic Sea.108 One 
explanation for the fact that Raymond opted to take a landed route over chartering ships, is that 
he understood that the increased cost of passage for his forces would have greatly exceeded the 
cost of packing extra food for a longer, more arduous path.109 His preparations paid off as the 
army of Provencals passed through the Bulgarian highlands, during the winter, unscathed. 
During this leg of the trip, Raymond D’Aguilers, a fiery author and chaplain in Raymond’s army 
who refused to waste any opportunity to praise his leader, suggests that foraging was not an 
option for a period of three weeks as there was no game to be found.110 He writes of the 
conditions, “Truly, Sclavonia is a forsaken land, both inaccessible and mountainous, where for 
three weeks we saw neither wild beasts nor birds… We passed through Sclavonia without losses 
largely through God’s mercy, the hard work of the Count, and the counsel of Adhemar.”111 The 
only issues that the Provencals encountered on their journey occurred after Raymond had fallen 
ill and had to be escorted to Constantinople. In Raymond’s absence, the Provencals attempted to 
forage in Byzantine lands, only to be stopped after a skirmish with the forces Alexius had 
dispatched to escort them to the capital.112 
 
108 See Figure 1. 
109 Another explanation could be that taking the landed route, along a traditional pilgrim’s route would have 
been understood as a more pious action. However, none of the primary source authors provide any insight on the 
Count’s motivations for choosing his route. 
110 John H. Hill, and Laurita L. Hill. Raymond D’Aguilers Historia Francorum Ceperunt Iherusalem. 
(Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1968) 16-7. 
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These armies were not what Alexius had expected Urban to send when he had appealed 
for aid in 1095.113 The armies approaching Constantinople were not mercenaries sent to aid in 
the retaking of land Byzantine land, nor were they a traditional band of pilgrims headed for the 
Holy Land to perform acts of penance. From a Byzantine perspective, the crusaders were, at best, 
invading armies, marching through his empire, armed and approaching his capital expecting to 
rest and resupply. At worst, they were potentially a barbarous horde intent on ransacking his 
Empire to satisfy their sense of pride and greed.114 Having accepted, then subsequently banished, 
the People’s Crusade from the capital, Alexius faced the unenviable task of managing four 
incoming armies, whose combined might was near 60,000 people strong, some of which were 
led by past enemies. The general approach he took was to allow the crusaders use of the markets, 
but to have his military monitor their progress, intervening when they sought to forage or worse 
pillage in the Byzantine countryside. When it came to defending his interests from foreign 
invaders, Alexius showed both political cleverness and strength. While he knew the forces 
marshalling outside his capital were a potential threat, he was more than willing to restrict their 
access to Byzantine markets necessary for the crusaders’ resupplying in an attempt to control 
their behavior and elicit oaths of fealty from the leaders.  
Departing Constantinople, one major obstacle remained for the crusaders before they 
could enter Asia Minor and continue their march to Antioch, the city of Nicaea, a map of which 
is shown in Figure 3. Much like their arrival in Constantinople, the crusaders’ arrival at Nicaea 
was staggered with the earliest forces, a portion of whom had been sent ahead to clear a path 
through the mountains for the armies to follow, arriving around May 6, 1097 and the latest forces 
 
113 Anna Comnena seems to have been unaware of Alexius’ request for Frankish aid in his conflicts against 
the Turks in Anatolia, rather suggesting that the Crusade started as a Frankish plot. 
114 Dawes, The Alexiad. 249-51.  
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arriving in the first week of June.115 The siege began on May 14, 1097 and by June 20 Nicaea 
had fallen, surrendering to Byzantine forces.116  
 
Figure 3 Map of the siege of Nicaea. Image from Victory in the East by John France page 123. 
 
115 Hill. Gesta Francorum. 14., Fink. A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem. 81.  The anonymous author 
of the Gesta claims to have been amongst the first army to depart Constantinople following Godfrey, whereas 
Fulcher of Chartres admits to having been amongst the last to arrive, commenting on how the city had already been 
set to siege with the defending force having suffered many casualties.   
 116Hill. Gesta Francorum. 14-7., Sweetenham. Robert the Monk. 104-6.  Fink. A History of the Expedition 
to Jerusalem. 81-3., Edgington. Albert of Aachen, 58-73. 
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The speed with which the crusaders arrived at, besieged, and captured the city of Nicaea, 
is due in large part to the logistical boon offered by the Byzantine’s infrastructure. Despite initial 
shortages that were relieved with Bohemond’s arrival at the city the crusader armies thrived 
during the siege.117 As Fulcher of Chartres writes, “for as long as we besieged the city of Nicaea 
food was brought in by ocean ships with the consent of the emperor. Then our leaders ordered 
machines of war to be made, battering-rams, scrofae, wooden towers, and petrariae.”118 What 
Fulcher describes are crusader forces operating at peak efficiency, unhindered by hunger or 
thirst, with materials sufficient to construct proper siege engines for attacking a fortified city. 
The Byzantine war machine was behind them and in that moment their victory was all but 
inevitable. At Nicaea, the crusader forces exhibited such a mastery of logistical planning and 
execution that they were able to able to receive Byzantine warships at the port of Civitot, where 
they were brought ashore then transported through the mountains by teams of oxen, so they 
could be launched into the city’s neighboring lake, securing a blockade around the city and 
forcing a surrender.119 
The fact that the Byzantines, and not the crusaders, were the ones to accept the surrender 
seems to have been the last straw in driving the crusaders to hurry towards the Middle East, their 
true objective. This decision, however, would take the crusaders away from the infrastructure 
that had served them so well at Nicaea. As they departed Byzantine lands at Dorylaeum, the 
crusaders exited the first logistical stage of their campaign. Going forward, logistics were going 
to become a more complicated issue, as the crusaders entered a hostile landscape, with 
challenges they were ill prepared to face.   
 
117 Hill. Gesta Francorum. 14. 
118 Fink. A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem. 82. Scrofae are indicated to have been portable 
defensive shelters, and petrariae were a form of catapult more properly called a mangonel.  
119 Hill. Gesta Francorum. 16., Levine. The Deeds of God. 58. 
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CHAPTER 2: TRIBULATIONS: From Nicaea 1097 through Antioch 1098 
 
Though it was off to a favorable start, the First Crusade was far from over, and the 
crusaders were still ignorant of the true scope of the hazards they would face in the Middle East 
from 1097 through the campaign’s conclusion in 1099. The march to and subsequent sieges of 
Antioch presented challenges to the crusaders which would affect their logistical practices and 
provisioning, ranging in intensity from troubling to devastating. As seen with the ill-fated 
People’s Crusade, and cautioned against centuries earlier by Vegetius, a summertime march with 
a large force, such as that of the crusader armies, could be hazardous. Scholars of later European 
wars will recognize similarities in the challenges faced by the crusaders to the challenges 
Napoleon and his Grande Armee in the French Emperor’s unsuccessful invasion of Russia. For 
both invading armies, the problems of provisioning massive armies were exacerbated by the 
weather extremes of the respective regions. 
The second stage of the First Crusade spans from the march south through the Amanus 
Mountains to Antioch where they arrived in October of 1097 up through the conclusion of the 
second siege of Antioch in June 1098. Between these events the crusaders experienced 
skirmishes with Islamic forces on the road to Antioch, Baldwin and Tancred’s diversion to and 
conquest of Edessa, and the two sieges of Antioch. During this stage, the crusaders departed 
from the Byzantine Empire’s landholdings and infrastructure, which limited future access to 
markets, as the towns they encountered were under no imperial compulsion to provide for the 
crusaders.120 Furthermore, the crusaders were not entering a pristine landscape.  
 
120 While the towns could not be forced to trade with the crusaders, some opted to do so, with harmful 
effects on the crusaders’ alliance with the Byzantines 
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In the latter parts of the eleventh century and early decades of the twelfth, Syria was 
plagued by wars between up to six separate Islamic factions: the Fatimid Empire; local Arab 
tribes and princes; the Seljuk Turks; the Turkish military officers; non-Seljuk Turkish tribes, and 
even the general populace.121 The natural result of so many groups vying for supremacy was 
political and military chaos resembling complete anarchy. For some of these groups, mainly the 
non-Fatimid and non-Seljuk factions, the crusaders represented an army with whom they shared 
a common enemy. As a result, some of the local towns and nobility were welcoming and willing 
to provide use of their markets. Those who took exception to the crusaders’ invasion presented a 
resistance, as could be expected, but their resistance was weakened by the comparative disunity 
amongst the Islamic nobility. However, the decades of warfare in Syria and Asia Minor created a 
different logistical problem for the crusaders. The repeated conflicts had taxed the region’s 
capacity to produce food, leaving little available for forage, be it through the collection or 
destruction of crops, or inability to work the fields. Food aside, the passage through the Amanus 
Mountains was not an easy one, and would prove to weaken the crusaders before arriving at the 
walls of Antioch.  
Departing from Nicaea in June of 1097 meant that the crusaders would be marching to 
Antioch during the hottest part of the summer, an unenviable task for any force, especially one as 
large as the combined army of the crusaders, which numbered around 50,000 after Nicaea. At 
this time, each of the leaders who had departed Europe still remained with the army, and Bishop 
Adhemar of Le Puy was still the recognized leader. Their chosen route carried them by way of 
Dorylaeum, a formerly Roman way-station and nexus to the road systems spreading throughout 
Anatolia, from which they could resupply and chose a route to Antioch. They had the options of 
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travelling along a “Pilgrim’s Road” going by way of the Cilician Gates, a 350-kilometer route, or 
traversing the Amanus Mountains by way of Caesarea, a 630-kilometer route.122 As the Crusade 
leaders were aware, marching in a single, consolidated force would have been ill-advised, as it 
would slow their progress and leave them vulnerable to attack. In fact, they were attacked as they 
departed from Dorylaeum. On July 1, the Seljuk Sultan of Nicaea, Kilij Arslan, understandably 
irked by the crusaders’ capture of his capital, led a violent but ultimately unsuccessful attack 
against their forces, which served to remind the Crusade leaders of the inherent dangers of 
rallying and moving massive armies.123  
Knowing of the danger and difficulty of provisioning their consolidated forces, the 
Crusade leaders split the army in two parts. The armies led by Tancred and Baldwin formed one 
faction which took the shorter route, while Raymond and Bohemund led the main bulk of their 
forces through the mountains, accompanied by the rest of the leaders. In terms of total numbers, 
Ralph of Caen suggests that Tancred commanded around 300 men, divided into 100 Knights and 
around 200 archers, while upon arrival at Tarsus, Baldwin commanded 500 knights and 2,000 
infantry.124 This leaves nearly 47,000 people in the main group, hardly a reduction in size or 
strength. However, aside from Baldwin and Tancred’s diversion it is nigh impossible to 
determine further subdivision of the crusader army in the march to Antioch, as the remaining 
leaders all followed the same route through Asia Minor. Of the two groups, the main body will 
be addressed first, as theirs was the route that led directly to Antioch and the effects of their 
march were most heavily felt during the siege.  
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Figure 4 Map of the Crusaders' routes through Asia Minor. Image from Victory in the East by John France, page. 94. 
The decision to lead the larger of the two forces across the longer, mountainous route 
may seem ill-advised, as taking such a path was a more daunting task than taking a lowland one. 
However, such a task was not without precedent. In his march to Constantinople Raymond IV 
had successfully leading the largest contingent of crusaders across an even greater distance, 
likewise through the mountains. Another similar passage may not have seemed such a daunting 
task in the wake of his past success. However, Raymond was facing very different circumstances 
in Anatolia. Rather than marching through the cooler fall and winter months, he would be 
leading his forces through the heat of the summer along roads which were in far worse condition. 
Unlike the pilgrimage roads they had previously traversed, the roads in Asia Minor would have 
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suffered from the chaos and warfare endemic in the Muslim conquests in the area.125 However, 
even without the additional damage and wear incurred by decades of war, the formerly 
Byzantine roads would not have been suitable for the crusaders’ carts and wagons. In his 
contribution to Pryor’s Logistics of Warfare in the Age of Crusades, John Haldon addresses 
Byzantine roads and communication, he indicates that from the sixth century through the ninth, 
maintenance on Byzantine roads had declined and become a local concern rather than an 
Imperial one.126 One of the most important results of this decline was a shift in transportive 
regime from wheeled carts and wagons to pack beasts which lead to a narrowing of many roads 
further away from key cities like Constantinople.127 
Damaged or poorly maintained roads would not only slow the crusaders’ wagons and 
carts, they also represented a further danger for their animals, which were already at risk due to 
the aridity and heat. The loss of a single horse in a knight’s retinue could present a variety of 
problems depending on the particular role the horse filled. Loss of a warhorse affected the 
knight’s ability to fight whereas the loss of a pack beast meant that either the supplies it carried 
were likewise lost, or that whatever could be salvaged had to then be carried by the people.128 
The near unanimously agreed upon chronicler accounts recount how oxen were utilized as 
mounts by desperate knights and how the people sought to use donkeys, cattle, goats, rams and 
even dogs to help transport their supplies and weaponry as they lost their horses and carts to the 
treacherous mountain paths and crippling aridity. Peter Tudebode’s eyewitness account provides 
the following description of events:  
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Horses plunged over cliffs and pack animals tumbled over one another as tearful knights 
stood everywhere wringing their hands, overcome by grief and shock. Doubtful of the 
fate of themselves and their arms, they sold their shields, expensive breastplates and 
helmets for three or five denarii or more, if possible. Those who could not sell their 
worthless arms threw them down and marched on.129  
 
The grim reality facing Raymond’s group was that the mountain roads they sought to utilize 
were too narrow and in far too poor condition to allow the use of their horses, carts or wagons. 
Aside from the conditions of the roads, aridity was another problem vexing the crusaders and 
their animals alike. Each horse in the crusader army needed a minimum of 30 liters of water on a 
daily basis, not accounting for strenuous labor or marching, and the crusaders were marching 
through dry summer heat of Anatolia.130 The very landscape through which the crusaders moved 
had become an enemy to their campaign’s progress. As scholars of later European military 
affairs can confirm, the First Crusade was neither the first nor the last time the environment 
presented a crippling obstacle to an invading force.  
These events strike a resonant chord with those surrounding Napoleon Bonaparte’s ill-
fated Russian Campaign in 1812. For a myriad of reasons, mostly political, the French Emperor 
sought to invade Russia, rallying an army over 600,000 strong to undertake his invasion.131 As 
can be expected, provisioning an army of such unprecedented size presented a proportionally 
incredible challenge. Furthermore, Napoleon was aware that Russia would, most likely, present 
the greatest challenge he had yet faced in terms of military resistance, environmental conditions 
and even infrastructural issues regarding poor roads.132 The land he intended to invade was vast, 
more so than any he had previously sought to dominate, yet with its size came the potential for 
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bounteous forage to be extracted to feed his army. His over 600,000 soldiers were accompanied 
and supported by some 200,000 animals split amongst his cavalry, artillery and supply trains. 
While his men could be fed on the supplies transported by 600 light carts, 600 heavy wagons, 
252 four-animal wagons, and whatever draft oxen they could afford to slaughter as the campaign 
dragged on, the fodder requirements of his animals still had to be met. Fearing that the Russians 
may attempt a scorched earth policy to deny his army the necessary provisions he might seek to 
forage, Napoleon sought to mitigate this need by making his army as self-reliant as possible, 
though it was unreasonable to believe that he could eliminate the army’s reliance on forage. 
Knowing this, Napoleon had scheduled his invasion to coincide with the peak of the Russian 
growing season, when the plains would be lush with grass as to increase the likelihood that they 
could at least draw some amount of fodder from them.133 He was aware that poor roads would 
slow his army’s progress, though the exact degree to which they eventually did, seems to have 
been unknown or expected.  
For all his planning, however, Napoleon ultimately failed in his invasion of Russia, 
turning back as his army reached a burned Moscow. Rather than face Napoleon’s superior might, 
the Russians, led by Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, engaged in the very 
tactics Napoleon had feared, burning their own towns, accumulated food stores, and surrounding 
countryside, as to deny the French any possible provisions. Continuing in this manner, the 
Russians led Napoleon’s army through the Russian countryside, burning everything in their 
wake, drawing out the confrontation and waiting for the effects of an extended campaign to 
devastate the increasingly overextended French army. As the campaign extended into the late 
summer months, the French began to suffer from depletion of their resources, loss of their 
 
133 Ibid., 859. 
51 
 
soldiers, and the combined effects of extreme heat and disease.134 By the time he captured 
Moscow, only 100,000 soldiers, less than a sixth of his starting forces, remained in Napoleon’s 
army. Having failed to break the Russian resistance, Napoleon began his retreat, and the 
Russians began their counter attack.135 The invasion of Russia, despite careful planning, had 
failed. 
While this example is separated from the First Crusade by 716 years of technological, 
cultural and tactical advancement, the core elements of each remain comparable. Each army was 
at their respective times, enormous in size, utilizing their local logistical and tactical systems to 
invade foreign land, and ultimately crippled as they became overextended in a hostile 
environment. Furthermore, their available logistical systems were comprised of the same three 
main mechanics of transportation, wheels, hooves, and feet. Where they differed is in how the 
environment was utilized and in the ultimate results of each campaign. Knowing it would be 
their best weapon and defense against Napoleon, the Russians burned their own land destroying 
the food sources he sought to obtain through forage. In the case of the First Crusade, the 
crusaders likewise experienced problems of overextension and less than adequate available 
forage, but this had come as secondary result of the conflicts between the six warring Islamic 
factions. Furthermore, whereas Napoleon’s invasion failed, the crusaders succeeded in theirs. 
The most important factor in deciding these different outcomes, however, is how the crusaders 
were able to eventually adjust their logistics and recover from their privation, while Napoleon’s 
army was unable to do so before losing the bulk of their forces and all of their morale. The 
crusaders, in so far as they have been addressed to this point, have yet to encounter their greatest 
hardships.  
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In their passage through the Amanus Mountains, the crusaders came face to face with the 
fact that even the landscape itself was their enemy. The heat, aridity, and even the battle scars it 
bore from decades of warfare worked in concert to deprive the crusaders of desperately needed 
food, animals, and weaponry including materials needed for siege weapons. Amidst their internal 
conflicts, the six warring Islamic factions had turned the very ground beneath the crusaders feet 
into a weapon to be levied against the invaders. The weapon proved effective, as when the 
crusader forces arrived at Antioch in mid-October of 1097, the robust armies that had set siege to 
Nicaea and rebuffed Kilij Arslan now were haggard, exhausted, hungry enough to strip the 
Orontes River valley of its bounty. 
Before continuing to the events of the first siege of Antioch, it is necessary to address the 
campaign undertaken by Baldwin and Tancred, which culminated in Baldwin’s capture of the 
city of Edessa. Among the chroniclers who speak on their motivations, only Fulcher of Chartres 
suggests that anything other than greed drove Baldwin and Tancred eastward, away from the 
bulk of the Army.136 Fulcher suggests the following,  
When we reached the city of Heraclea, we beheld a certain sign in the sky which 
appeared in brilliant whiteness in the shape of a sword with the point toward the East. 
What it portended for the future we did not know, but we left the present and the future to 
God… And so trusting in the Lord and in his own strength, Baldwin collected a few 
knights and set out toward the Euphrates.137  
 
Fulcher’s claim of a divine inspiration for Baldwin’s departure to Edessa is contrasted with 
claims by Guibert de Nogent, Baldric of Bourgueil, Peter Tudebode and Albert of Aachen each 
stating that Baldwin and Tancred each sought to take for themselves landholdings and riches in 
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the East.138 It makes sense that Fulcher is alone in his claims, however, given that he himself 
accompanied Baldwin to Edessa, only to rejoin the main bulk of the crusaders later on. They 
came into contact at Tarsus, which Tancred had set to siege, seeking to claim dominion of the 
city. With the arrival of Baldwin and his army, widely attested to be the larger force between the 
two men, the city fell within short order.139 Conflict broke out between the two, with Tancred 
conceding Tarsus to Baldwin, due to the superior strength of the latter’s army. Their rivalry 
would come to a head at Mamistra where the two came to blows over issues surrounding trade 
and provisioning between their two armies and the landholdings they had obtained.140 Though 
they eventually buried the hatchet, with Tancred even coming to rescue a surrounded Baldwin 
outside Edessa, their rivalry created enough friction between them to cause Tancred to abandon 
their campaign and return to the main body of the crusaders. For his part, Baldwin succeeded in 
claiming dominance of Edessa by March of 1098, after unseating the then-current governor by 
aiding the rioting people of the city.141   
From a logistical standpoint the importance of their campaign is seen in the cities they 
took, namely Edessa and Mamistra. Located in what is now southeastern Turkey, Edessa was 
watered by the Euphrates, along with at least three other smaller rivers, making it incredibly 
fertile. As the Crusade persisted into 1098, Edessa would serve as a source of both horses and 
money for the crusader forces as they continued their march to Jerusalem.142 While this did little 
to provide for the needs of the beleaguered crusaders besieging Antioch, it did offer them aid of a 
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sort. The Atabeg of Mosul, Kerbogha, a Seljuk Turkish prince with ties to the Abbasid Caliphate, 
wasted three weeks in May of 1098 in a vain attempt to unseat Baldwin from his newly-acquired 
County.143 None of the cities or castles that Baldwin and Tancred captured whilst campaigning in 
the East were included in the initial goal of liberating Jerusalem. It was not necessary that the 
castles be captured from a strategic perspective, given how far out of the way they were. 
However, the two young knights’ actions opened up new invaluable sources of supplies and 
horses for the crusader armies to utilize in the later parts of the campaign. 
Returning to Antioch, the crusaders arrived at its gates in October of 1097, greeted with 
conditions widely recognized as beneficial to besieging the city. Food was plentiful in the 
Orontes river valley, and the crusaders had managed to intercept, capture, and plunder a Turkish 
supply caravan intended to relieve the garrison at Antioch.144  
Of the near 60,000 crusaders who had left Constantinople, only around 30,000-35,000 
had reached Antioch. The crusaders had incurred these losses through casualties in battle, 
desertion, deaths during the march, and by the troops which had accompanied Baldwin and 
Tancred in their Cilician adventure.145 As seen in Figure 5 below, the city of Antioch was 
positioned between the two mountain ranges forming the Orontes River valley, seated on a 
crossroads south of the Orontes River with Mount Silpius directly to its southernmost border.146 
Its innermost citadel was positioned high upon the side of the mountain, rendering it impossible 
to completely encircle, as the crusaders had eventually done at Nicaea.147 According to Raymond 
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D’Aguilers, the banks of the Orontes rendered the surrounding landscape marshy, further 
complicating the prospect of besieging the city.148  
 
Figure 5 Map of the area surrounding Antioch. Image from Victory in the East by John France, page 207. 
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Both the road and the leg of the Orontes River leading southeast of the city led to St. Symeon 
Port connecting the city to the Mediterranean Sea from which food, supplies, and people could 
be transported from Europe to Syria. Though the port was not integrated in the city itself, the 
defenders could easily ambush and intercept incoming supplies to the crusaders’ encampments, 
making it difficult for the bulk of crusader forces to actually receive supplies from the port.149 So 
long as Antioch was in enemy hands, the crusaders would be unable to make full use of either 
the port of St. Symeon or the Orontes River. However, the area was lacking in one particularly 
important aspect for the crusaders planned endeavors, timber. Without available timber, the 
crusaders were hard-pressed to construct siege engines, though they were able to construct 
fortifications from stone providing a measure of defense.150 Robert the Monk is completely 
ignorant of the lack of wood in the area claiming that the crusaders had set about building siege 
craft, such as catapults, which would have been impossible for the army.151 Their siege was 
necessary because Antioch had to fall for the First Crusade to realize its ultimate objective. It 
was too important as a commercial hub and source of food to allow it to stay under Islamic 
control. In terms of supplies and supply lines, the crusaders had access to the markets of some 
cities such as Tripoli, which they obtained from the city’s rulers, as well as the available food in 
the Orontes River valley, and port cities such as Mamistra, Alexandretta, Tarsus, Laodicea, and 
St. Symeon.152 Of these sources, the most convenient was the river valley, as foraging parties 
could be mobilized in the area so long as the valley remained productive.  
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From the other sources, incoming shipments of supplies would have to be offloaded from 
ships then sent by caravan to the crusaders, again making use of pack beasts, wagons, and carts, 
in so far as they could be utilized, in hopes they would arrive in safety. For those supplies, the 
crusaders still yet relied on their Byzantine allies despite having parted ways with their armies.153 
In the beginning of the first siege, food was plentiful and the general outlook amongst the 
crusaders was optimistic.154 Raymond D’Aguilers claims that such was the prosperity at the 
outset of the first siege of Antioch that even in the camps, the crusader forces dined on the “best 
cuts, rump and shoulders, scorned brisket, and thought nothing of grain and wine,” and the 
temperament was such as to allow the crusaders to forget their enemies in Antioch, save for the 
sentries atop their walls.155 As shown by Figure 6, below, the crusaders had blockaded three of 
the five gates of Antioch, and engaged in skirmishes with the defenders near the fourth. 
However, the prosperity was short-lived, as Antioch’s defenders, understandably, took exception 
to the army attempting to surround their city on three of four sides.  
Unwilling to sit idly by and allow the besieging army to starve them out without 
resistance, the defenders sent out raiding parties from Antioch’s unblockaded Bridge Gate, meant 
to harass the crusaders, kill the foraging parties they sent out from their camps, and intercept 
caravans from the Port of St. Symeon.156 Rather than ride out to meet the crusaders’ armies, 
exchanging the safety of their garrison for the folly of a pitched battle, the besieged force under 
Emir Yaghi Siyan, a Seljuk Turk, sought to turn the crusaders’ tactics against them. Wars of 
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attrition cuts both ways, and Yaghi Siyan was gambling on the chance that the besieged might 
starve the besiegers before their own supplies ran out. 
 
Figure 6 Map of the siege of Antioch Oct. 1097- Feb 1098.Image from Victory in the East by John France, page 221. 
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The tactic was brilliant and effective, crippling the crusaders through famine where force 
of arms would not suffice. As the months progressed into the winter, the 30,000 strong besieging 
force found themselves low on provisions by Christmas of 1097. The winter months between 
1097 and 1098 were among the most harrowing for the armies of the First Crusade. Food was 
scarce and trade had all but dried up, as the snow and ice in the mountain passes had isolated the 
army, leaving them cold, starving, and miserable before Antioch’s nigh-impregnable walls.157 
Here, Vegetius’ writings proved prophetic:  
Famine makes greater havoc in an army than the enemy and is more terrible than the 
sword. Time and opportunity may help to retrieve other misfortunes, but where forage 
and provisions have not been carefully provided, the evil is without remedy. The main 
and principal point is to secure plenty of provisions and destroy the enemy by famine.158  
 
The bitter irony of their own tactics and philosophy on war being applied against them by 
the besieged Muslim forces cannot have been lost on the crusade leaders. Among the chroniclers, 
the more vivid descriptions of the crusaders’ suffering outside Antioch are not found in the 
eyewitness accounts, but rather those written by clerics in the aftermath such as Robert the 
Monk, Albert of Aachen and Guibert of Nogent. The Gesta author, Raymond D’Aguilers and 
Peter Tudebode all mention that by Christmas, food was scarce and foraging near impossible. 
However they give no specific details of their suffering, but rather immediately progress to 
speaking on what the crusade leaders determined to do to rectify the situation.159 Among the 
eyewitnesses, Fulcher of Chartres stands as an exception to this trend, going into detail about the 
variety of dietary options the crusaders explored for want of bread and the “Miserable Poverty” 
they experienced. Fulcher claims that for their winter at Antioch, the crusaders dined on, “the 
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stalks of beans still growing in the fields, many kinds of herbs unseasoned with salt, and even 
thistles which because of the lack of firewood were not well cooked and therefore irritated the 
tongues of those eating them. They also ate horses, asses, camels, dogs, and even rats. The 
poorer people ate even the hides of animals and the seeds of grain found in manure.”160  
This discrepancy should not suggest that the eyewitnesses either lacked conviction or did 
not endure great hardship. Rather it seems they deemed it more important to address the actions 
taken to end their suffering rather than the details of their misery. However, religious fervor 
should not be discarded as a precondition of the crusaders’ ultimate victory. The eyewitnesses 
never denounced their faith, even if they chose not to address its importance in their ordeal at 
Antioch. Were it not for their religious zeal, they would not have referred to themselves as 
pilgrims, nor is it likely that so many noncombatants would have accompanied the armies on the 
campaign. Freezing and starving before a city that denied their attempts to capture it for over 
near nine months, the crusaders, in majority, remained firm in their convictions that they were on 
a divinely sanctioned mission, to such a degree that they refused to break, and outlasted the 
winter despite their suffering.161  
The winter spent at Antioch was a logistical nightmare, and were it not for the crusaders’ 
faith that it was God’s will that they liberate Jerusalem, the Crusade could have easily died there 
in Syria simply through desertion. Victory, defeat, prosperity and privation, all were directly tied 
to how the crusaders handled logistics in the First Crusade’s various stages. Where their 
logistical systems were insufficient to supply the full measure of their needs, as was the case at 
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Antioch, the crusaders suffered. Though it was their greatest challenge, the crusaders survived, 
and while many land routes had been cut off from them, they still held the port of St. Symeon, 
and they still had their alliance with Byzantines. Despite the fact they had left his armies at 
Nicaea, Alexius seems to have been determined to uphold his responsibilities toward their 
alliance. The crusaders’ survival at Antioch relied on Byzantine shipping through the port of St. 
Symeon, as well as Italian shipping.162  
As winter gave way to Spring, the arrival of more supply fleets brought relief to the 
crusaders, and Baldwin began to send aid from his seat in Edessa. Albert of Aachen indicates 
that Baldwin sent money, horses, weapons in addition to “corn, barley, wine and oil.”163 
Knowing that Yaghi Siyan would not allow them to resupply unchallenged, the crusaders set 
about building a new fort, The Mahomeries Tower, outside of Antioch’s Bridge Gate, which 
faced the port of St. Symeon, shown in Figure 7, below.  
As expected, the army of Antioch set an ambush for the incoming caravan, but it was 
defeated by a counter attack led by Godfrey, allowing the crusaders to resupply.164 The 
crusaders’ completion of the Mahomeries Tower in March of 1098, followed by the construction 
of Tancred’s Tower in April marked the beginning of the end of this first siege of Antioch. With 
these towers in place, the crusaders could both check the defenders’ activities and raiding, in 
doing so they could protect any further incoming shipments and begin to recover, and finally cut 
off the city of Antioch, completing their blockade.165  
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Figure 7 Map of the siege of Antioch March-May 1098. Image from Victory in the East by John France, page 252. 
Any hope for Emir Yaghi Siyan of Antioch now rested with the possibility of external 
aid, which he had sent for in December of 1097, and the chance whatever relief arrived might be 
strong enough to destroy the crusaders. The aid he hoped for was en route, as the crusaders soon 
found out, much to their dismay.166  
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The crusaders had just recently been able to re-establish their supply lines through the 
port of St. Symeon and were in no fit state to withstand an attack, dedicated as they were to the 
siege. However, the nine-month siege had devastated Antioch, depleting the city’s food supply 
leaving them starved, weakened, and desperate for an end of the siege. However, a guard by the 
name of Firuz, through a series of dialogues with Bohemund, had agreed to allow Bohemund’s 
forces scale the walls and capture the city in exchange for a bribe.167 Firuz’s motivations are not 
really discernable from the multiple disparate claims regarding his person and the nature of his 
interactions with Bohemond. What is clear however is that by June, conditions within Antioch 
had deteriorated to such a degree that the promise of personal wealth as well as a cessation of the 
blockade was sufficient to convince the man to betray Antioch to Bohemond’s control. 
Bohemond’s actions in this regard have often been portrayed in much the same light as 
Baldwin and Tancred’s motivations for their campaign to Edessa, that is to say the actions of a 
man concerned primarily with his own self-interest. Arguments of this kind have a good deal of 
support from the chroniclers as they record him only enacting his plan after receiving 
confirmation from the other Crusade leaders that he would be given dominion over the city 
provided he succeed in capturing it.168 However, the crusaders were well aware that they were 
weakened from their winter time ordeal, and that Seljuk Turkish reinforcements were soon to 
arrive. Bohemund himself was instrumental in many of the raids and foraging parties sent out to 
alleviate the crusaders’ suffering. The crusaders had spent enough time outside Antioch to know 
two essential points. First of all, the city was a defensible position, an obvious enough statement, 
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but an important one given that the crusaders believed that they would be outnumbered when 
Kerbogha arrived.169 Second, and more importantly, Antioch’s size made it difficult to fully 
blockade. The Bridge Gate, which provided easy access to the port, was the third of four gates 
from where Kerbogha’s army approached. So long as they could prevent their access to the port 
of St. Symeon from being cut off, there was a chance, slight though it was, they could outlast the 
Turkish prince. On June 2, 1098, Bohemund and a contingent of knights and soldiers loyal to 
him scaled the walls and by the time the sun rose on June 3, 1098, Bohemond’s banner flew over 
the city and the first siege of Antioch had ended.170  
The situation inside the city walls was dire. The nine-month siege had devastated 
Antioch, and the crusaders were greeted with yet more privation and death within the walls.171 
The sources differ on the amount of wealth within Antioch, Raymond D’Aguilers boasts of 
plenty while Albert laments the scarcity. In this case, it seems prudent to favor Albert, as 
Raymond is both prone to exaggeration when speaking of the crusaders’ exploits and gains and 
could be speaking in terms of riches and plunder rather than food. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
a city coming out of a nine-month long siege would have any appreciable stocks of food 
remaining in it, especially when one considers the chronicler accounts of starvation in the second 
siege. Any hopes that the crusaders might be able to keep their access to the port of St. Symeon 
were dashed with Kerbogha’s arrival four days after they entered the city. The second siege of 
Antioch, shown in Figure 8, began on June 7, and the crusaders within Antioch were in worse 
shape than Yaghi Siyan had been when they arrived. Unable to resist Kerbogha in the way they 
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had been resisted, the crusaders found themselves blockaded with in the city in a matter of three 
weeks, facing the very tactics they had utilized in the first siege. 
 
Figure 8 Kerbogha's siege of Antioch June 4-28, 1098. Image from Victory in the East by John France, page 272. 
The point of siege warfare is to deny the enemy forces food, blockading and starving 
them until their will to resist is broken. The crusaders knew this tactic all too well. Furthermore, 
as they grew weaker, Kerbogha’s forces would grow stronger, as they could draw resources from 
their allies without fear of crusader interference. There was only one solution to the logistical 
problem they now faced, and it was risky. They had to attack Kerbogha’s forces before the siege 
devastated their forces. The chroniclers, without exception, attribute the crusaders’ victory to 
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divine intervention spurred by the discovery of the Holy Lance of St. Andrew.172 On June 28, 
they attacked. Marching out from the Bridge Gate, the crusaders rallied in force to attack 
Kerbogha’s forces. As to why Kerbogha allowed them to gather in force, Peter Tudebode and the 
Gesta author both suggests it was so that he could maximize his chances of capturing the bulk of 
the army and bring a decisive end to their campaign.173 In doing so, he gave the crusaders the 
opening they needed to rally their army in force and launch a desperate attack which broke his 
army’s ranks and ended the Second siege of Antioch. 
The end of the second siege of Antioch heralded the end of the second phase of the First 
Crusade. Now the crusaders held both Edessa and Antioch, cities that not only would become the 
capitals of two of the crusader states, eventually, but also held incredible logistical value. From 
Baldwin’s seat in Edessa horses and coin flowed to the crusader army, while Antioch offered 
control of the fertile Orontes River valley and the port of St. Symeon. The crusaders had earned 
their respite, and would delay the continuation of their march until November. The end was in 
sight. In the final phase of the First Crusade, the crusaders, specifically those led by Raymond IV 
of St. Gilles faced very different conditions than they had in the first two phases. For Raymond 
IV, diplomacy would become a valuable tool in his logistical toolbelt. 
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CHAPTER 3: VICTORY: From Antioch 1098 through Jerusalem 1099 
 
The final phase of the First Crusade was strikingly different from the previous phases, 
with the crusaders’ approach to logistics being no exception. This phase saw the crusader army 
split into two factions, one led by Raymond IV of St. Gilles, and the other led initially by 
Bohemond, but later by Godfrey and Robert of Flanders when Bohemond abandoned the 
campaign, to secure his hold over Antioch. The death of Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy at Antioch 
left the princes without their counselor and arbitrator.174 With their forces parting ways at 
Ma’arrat, the armies of Raymond IV and Godfrey took two drastically different routes south 
from Ma’arrat in January 1099 and Laodicea in February 1099 respectively, reuniting at Arqah 
in March as shown in Figure 9 below. Raymond’s march presented him with critical logistical 
concerns, as he had to rebuild his army without having access to the Mediterranean Sea. His 
march is covered in greater detail than Godfrey’s by the eyewitness authors, the Gesta author, 
Raymond D’Aguilers, and Peter Tudebode, who accompanied him. To compensate for losing 
access to the Mediterranean, Raymond IV had to adapt, and alter his approach to logistics to a 
degree which Godfrey and Robert of Flanders did not. Diplomacy became Raymond’s greatest 
logistical tool preceding Arqah, and his exploits in the march from Ma’arrat demand a greater 
deal of analysis than that of his fellow Crusade leaders. 
Following their hellish nine-month ordeal, Antioch had been captured, and with it, the 
Orontes River and the Mediterranean Sea were open to the crusaders. However, the army was 
exhausted, hungry, and weakened due to the loss of their horses during the course of the sieges. 
The crusaders’ fighting strength was somewhere between 14,000 and 20,000 total combatants, 
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given that 30,000 had begun the first siege of Antioch and their losses were severe.175 The 
immediate concern for the crusaders’ leaders was for their armies to resupply and rest before 
continuing their campaign. 
 
Figure 9 The crusader's roads from Antioch to Jerusalem. Image from Armies of Heaven: The First Crusade and the Quest for 
Apocalypse by Jay Rubenstein, page 237. 
 
175 France. Victory in the East. 131, 269. France suggests that the 14,000 was the total force available to 
march in January of 1099. He presents no exact numerical value for their forces after Antioch, only suggesting that 
they could not have been as many as 30,000 including non-combatants. 
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Their victory over Kerbogha’s numerically superior force had brought with it some the spoils of 
their camp, and re-opened the road to the Port of St. Symeon as potential means to alleviate their 
needs.176 Among the eyewitness accounts, the Gesta author, Raymond D’Aguilers, and Peter 
Tudebode all speak of the plunder, including horses, cattle, camels, grain, wine, and inedible 
items available in Kerbogha’s camp. The Gesta author suggests that Kerbogha’s army attempted 
to set fire to the camp as they fled.177 While the spoils taken from Kerbogha’s camp would 
provide a short-term relief for the beleaguered army, they would need a more sustainable 
solution if they intended to continue to Jerusalem. Recognizing the severity of their present 
circumstances, the Crusade leaders, who now consisted of Raymond IV, Godfrey of Bouillon, 
Bohemond and his nephew Tancred, Robert of Flanders, Hugh of Vermandois, and Robert of 
Normandy, realized they would need to send for help from Alexius. Designating Hugh of 
Vermandois as their emissary, the Crusade leaders sent envoys to Constantinople in search of 
aid.178 In the meantime, they rested in Antioch for four months from June through November 
1097 seemingly awaiting Byzantine supplies. Precious little is recorded in the chronicles and 
letters regarding any shipments or the general state of the crusaders’ provisions between their 
victory over Kerbogha in June of 1098 and the continuation of their campaign the following 
November. 
The interim months at Antioch were not by any means devoid of activity, with 
Bohemond and Raymond of St. Gilles engaging in political disputes over the city’s ownership in 
the wake of Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy’s death. France suggests that these disputes were the 
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culmination of the two men’s personal rivalry, which ultimately resulted in Bohemond’s 
eventual abandonment of the Crusade. Insofar as logistics are concerned, France posits it was 
during July of 1098 when Bohemond negotiated for Genoese aid and support of his claim on 
Antioch.179 The fleets sent as a part of these negotiations would be instrumental in provisioning 
the crusaders in their southward march down the Syrian coast and their eventual siege of 
Jerusalem.  
The crusaders could not stay in place indefinitely. With Antioch under their control, and 
the summer months having passed, the crusaders resumed their march. In mid-November, the 
armies led by Raymond IV, Robert of Flanders, and Bohemond set siege to Ma’arrat which fell 
to them in less than a month’s time. The size of their armies at the start of the siege is hard to 
determine. Raymond D’Aguilers suggests that Raymond IV had “less than 300 knights and only 
a small number of footmen” in the wake of Ma’arrat, but gives no tallies for before the siege.180 
Bohemond’s forces are completely uncounted. The reason this siege is noteworthy is because 
Ma’arrat served as a catalyst in forcing Raymond to advance further south ahead of his fellow 
crusade leaders. At Ma’arrat, the crusaders experienced such extreme suffering and privation that 
the poorest among them supposedly dined on human flesh.181  
These cannibalistic acts reportedly were committed sometime between the city’s capture 
and the continuation of the march Raymond’s faction in January 1099. All of the major Crusade 
chroniclers report on these events.182 Every one of the chroniclers, attest to the crusaders’ 
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cannibalism as an act of desperation. Historian Jay Rubenstein has argued against such claims, 
suggesting rather that the acts of cannibalism were performative rather than desperate. He 
presents his arguments in the article “Cannibals and crusaders” by suggesting that the Franks’ 
brutality and acts of cannibalism were but one necessary component in fashioning the crusaders 
as the agents of God’s will, his wrath incarnate.183 His overarching arguments address primarily 
how the chroniclers recorded these acts, and the psychological effects they would have had more 
so than the conditions surrounding the events. He suggests that the most probable explanation for 
ways the chroniclers addressed cannibalism is that it was a means of communicating the horror 
of the famine the crusaders experienced at Ma’arrat.184 This sentiment is continued in one of the 
crusader letters as well, from Daibert, Archbishop of Pisa, to the Pope and all of the Christian 
faithful.185 His letter reads of the events as follows.  
Our army defeated the enemy, but was continuing to suffer from hunger and fatigue as 
well as from quarrels among our leaders, so it set out for Syria where it captured the 
Saracen cities of Barra and Marra as well as the fortresses in the region. While we were 
resting there our Christian soldiers were so hungry that they ate the decomposing corpses 
of the Saracens.186 
  
Daibert indicates that while the army had been ready to commit such acts at Antioch, they did 
not succumb to their desperation until Ma’arrat. 
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Ma’arrat stands roughly 60 miles south-east of Antioch, less than 10 miles from Albarra, 
which Raymond IV had previously seized as a base of operations in the wake of Antioch, and 20 
miles from the Orontes river at its minimum distance, as indicated below in Figure 10. The city 
sat in a flat, open plain, possessing few natural defenses or advantages, with its only constructed 
defenses being the walls which covered about two square miles in area, and a ditch along the 
southern wall which Raymond IV had his forces fill in.187 The crusaders’ siege of Ma’arrat 
occurred exactly one year after the harsh Syrian winter crusaders had to endure at Antioch. The 
siege itself was handled with ease compared to the troubles they had faced at Antioch, as not 
only did Ma’arrat lack the protection of a mountain range on one side, but the crusaders had the 
ability and material to construct a siege tower and ladders allowing Raymond IV’s forces to 
breach the wall.188 As the Gesta author writes, “Raymond of St. Gilles caused a wooden siege-
tower to be built and it was strong and loft, so engineered and constructed that it ran upon four 
wheels… and it was higher than all the walls of the city.”189  
It would have been impractical for the crusaders to have imported the timber necessary 
for this tower’s construction by way of Antioch given Ma’arrat’s distance from the Orontes. 
While the eyewitnesses of the siege are silent on how the lumber was acquired, Albert of Aachen 
elucidates the matter in suggesting that Raymond obtained it, along with some much-needed 
provisions, in a successful raid in the mountainous region of Talamria.190 Albert of Aachen is 
further unique among the chroniclers in suggesting that the crusaders committed acts of 
cannibalism during the course of the siege, rather than in the aftermath of the city’s capture as 
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the other chroniclers indicate, and that Raymond’s actions in undertaking the aforementioned 
raid was direct reaction to the crusaders’ suffering and hardship.191 
 





Seeing as Albert’s account of the Crusade was written after the events had long since concluded, 
and even some of the eyewitness accounts, namely Raymond D’Aguilers, are known to have 
gotten some of the events out of order chronologically speaking, it is a forgivable error. 
Furthermore, it provides much-needed logistical information excluded from the other accounts.  
In terms of logistics, the crusaders present at Ma’arrat were forced to rely on what 
provisions Raymond IV had obtained in his raid in Talamria, as they were caught in a second 
winter time famine. While the siege of Ma’arrat lasted only five weeks, it was five weeks in a 
similar Syrian winter to the one which had plagued the crusaders only a year before at Antioch. 
One possible explanation for the famine is provided by Albert of Aachen. He suggests that the 
people of Ma’arrat had felt the parasitic effect of the crusaders’ long investment at Antioch 
which stripped the surrounding areas clean of resources and food, and fled into the mountains 
with their “possessions and herds.”192 Any food that remained after their departure would have 
been taken into the city in advance of the crusaders’ arrival, leaving the crusaders with little to 
find in the area.193 Unlike Antioch, where the Port of St. Symeon had provided the crusaders 
with some measure of relief from the Mediterranean, Ma’arrat was completely landlocked and 
sat 20 miles from the Orontes River, well beyond the reach of maritime trade and support.  
While Raymond IV’s raiding forays during the earlier part of the siege helped alleviate 
the problem of food supply during the siege, they also contributed to the harsher conditions the 
crusaders faced in the aftermath. The region around Ma’arrat had been depleted, and the 
crusaders were unable to forage far from the city, fearing the threat of attack from Islamic forces. 
In the face of such scant provisions, the poorest among the crusaders turned to what sources of 
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nourishment they could find, most infamously, human corpses.194 The association with crusader 
cannibalism and poverty is only suggested by Guibert of Nogent, an identified elitist. However, 
he is vague in his writing on the subject, suggesting that the crusaders were “entirely without 
resources, finding nothing in nearby areas to supply their needs.”195  
The crusaders’ reported acts of cannibalism coincided with another problem for the 
armies. Bohemond and Raymond IV’s rivalry split the crusader army into factions in the wake of 
the siege of Ma’arrat. Raymond D’Aguilers’ account of the siege and subsequent cannibalism 
place the latter events after Bohemond’s departure from the Crusade.196 This is particularly 
interesting because Peter Tudebode and the Gesta author, as well as many of the other 
chroniclers writing after the Crusade, place Bohemond’s departure after their accounts of 
cannibalism.197 However, none of the authors suggest how much time separated the acts of 
cannibalism and Bohemond’s departure. This raises the question: what relation, if any, existed 
between the practice of cannibalism and the departure of one of the two most powerful and 
respected Crusade leaders from the campaign? Clearly, the crusaders were having an issue with 
their supplies in the wake of the siege, and Bohemond’s departure would do nothing to alleviate 
their problems. Earlier in the campaign, it was Bohemond who had negotiated for supplies to be 
sent to the crusaders from Genoa. Having withdrawn support from Raymond of St. Gilles, 
Bohemond returned to Antioch, whereupon Fulcher of Chartres suggests, he banished any and all 
of Raymond IV’s remaining supporters and allies from the city.198 This left Raymond IV 
effectively cut off from the Mediterranean. In addition to Ma’arrat’s distance from the Orontes 
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River, Raymond IV now had to contend with the fact that his primary rival amongst the Crusade 
leaders held sole ownership of the city which oversaw trade routes travelling from the 
Mediterranean along the Orontes.   
The crusader army was now truly dissected. Raymond IV led a faction from Ma’arrat 
comprised of himself, Tancred, Bohemond’s nephew whose continuing military service 
Raymond had purchased until the army had taken Jerusalem, and Robert of Normandy, whom 
would join them at Kafartab. The second faction’s ranks included the armies led by Godfrey de 
Bouillon, Robert of Flanders, and Bohemond, who would abandon the Crusade entirely by 
March 1099.199 These factions took very different routes forward, though they reconvened at the 
siege of Arqah in March of 1099, as indicated previously in Figure 9.200 Of the two, Raymond 
IV’s route is the more interesting from a logistical perspective, as he spent the entirety of his 
march to Arqah isolated from the Mediterranean Sea, and the boon of maritime shipping. As they 
enjoyed this boon, Godfrey and Robert of Flanders did not have to adapt their approach to the 
Crusade and its logistical planning nearly to the degree that Raymond IV did.  
The desperate acts of cannibalism had shown the Count that the situation at Ma’arrat was 
untenable and his army would have to move on.201 However, the upcoming stage of the Crusade, 
insofar as Raymond’s forces were concerned, was very different in appearance and activity than 
its earlier stages. The situation was dire, and navigating it would require a degree of finesse on 
the part of Raymond IV. The march from Ma’arrat to Jerusalem was a comparatively less violent 
affair than the crusaders’ previous experiences in Asia Minor and Syria. It is during this phase 
where of the Crusade where the eyewitness accounts by the Gesta author, Peter Tudebode, and 
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Raymond D’Aguilers first portray Raymond of St. Gilles as a traditional pilgrim in appearance 
or actions.202 To quote Raymond D’Aguilers, “On the appointed day, the Count, his clerks, and 
the Bishop of Albara departed and trudged along barefooted, calling out for God’s mercy and the 
saints’ protection as flames set by the departing Christians mounted the ruins of Ma’arrat-an-
Nu’man”203 The image of Raymond IV in this passage is not that of the valiant military 
commander whom Raymond D’Aguilers profiled at the start of his account, where he claims 
that, “In the midst of these dangers the Count always protected his people by fighting in the 
rearguard and by being the last one to reach his quarters,” but rather that of a humbled pilgrim.204  
This change in presentation is accompanied with a change in behavior, regarding how Raymond 
IV sought to obtain provisions. In this final stretch the crusaders, first in Raymond’s faction but 
eventually with the reunited armies after Arqah, exhibit a willingness to negotiate with Islamic 
rulers which had not existed amongst them previously. In his march to Arqah, Raymond IV 
made deals with the rulers at Shaizar, Raphania, and Homs to purchase food and horses.205 
 John France has suggested that the Raymond IV’s initial march from Ma’arrat was 
“never intended as anything more than an extended raid whose continuation was provisional on 
better conditions and one which might be made to serve self-interest if all else fails,” and that 
“the count never intended to march to Jerusalem with his relatively small force.”206 Such 
arguments have their merits, given that Raymond was keenly aware that he was no longer 
leading a large or well-provisioned force. His faction possessed a combined military strength of 
between 450 and 500 knights, and an undocumented number of infantry.207 Raymond IV had 
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acquired this army by paying 15,000 solidi Tancred and Robert of Normandy in exchange for 
their military service. However, Raymond D’Aguilers suggests he was prepared to spend an 
additional 16,000 to purchase similar service from Godfrey and Robert of Flanders.208 
Geographically Raymond IV’s coalition was isolated from the Mediterranean by the Jabal 
Ansariayah, or Syrian Coastal Mountain Range, depicted in Figure 9 above, meaning that naval 
support and trade were inaccessible, leaving his army effectively stranded in hostile territory. It 
would not be until the siege of Arqah in March of 1099, that Godfrey of Bouillon and Robert of 
Flanders would rejoin their forces with Raymond’s. Until then, the Raymond IV’s military 
strength would be diminished, leaving him too weak to risk open conflict where it was 
unnecessary.  
However, it seems incorrect to suggest that Raymond did not intend to lead his coalition 
to Jerusalem from the time he departed Ma’arrat, as John France maintains. The eyewitness 
accounts by the Gesta author, Raymond D’Aguilers and Peter Tudebode make it clear that this 
was not the case, and that Raymond’s march from Ma’arrat was made with the full intention of 
continuing south until they reached and took Jerusalem.209 They stress the piety of Raymond’s 
actions, reinforcing his image as that of a pilgrim. The Gesta author writes that, “When 
Raymond saw that he was the cause why none of the other leaders would set out on the way to 
the Holy Sepulchre he went out barefoot from Marra on the thirteenth of January.”210 It bears 
repeating that the Gesta author is widely considered to have been a militarily-inclined individual 
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rather than a religiously-inclined one, and he is indicating that it was Raymond’s piety rather 
than his military concerns which pushed him towards Jerusalem.211  
However, his behaviors in January and February of 1099 read as those of a practical 
military commander, one both in need of provisions and looking to strengthen his forces. His 
army was hungry and weakened. Raymond did not intend to attempt to take Jerusalem with his 
500 knights in their state. The fact that Raymond sought diplomatic solutions to his logistical 
problems indicates that he recognized that his forces were not strong enough in the wake of the 
siege at Ma’arrat to survive angering the local rulers. Therefore, he would have to replenish his 
forces while on the march. Jerusalem was the goal. He could not afford to waste time, resources, 
or lives in pointless or avoidable conflicts. Diplomacy and trade were simply the most practical 
way for Raymond to both obtain the food necessary to ensure his force would arrive at Jerusalem 
in the best possible condition to liberate the city from its Fatimid rulers, and further bolster his 
strength through the purchase of warhorses from the local rulers.212 Fortunately, the rulers of 
several Arabic principalities, the main resistance to Fatimid power in Syria, were sympathetic to 
Raymond IV given their shared Fatimid enemy.213 Ultimately, this diplomatic approach paid off, 
as his forces were able to purchase enough horses to more than double his cavalry’s numerical 
strength, resulting in a force of around 1,000 knights as they approached Arqah.214  
However, Raymond IV did not ignore other options or opportunities when they presented 
themselves. His march south was not entirely peaceful. The crusaders were attacked at their rear, 
where the stragglers in the army had fallen behind prompting Raymond IV to reposition his 
 
211 Connor Kostic, The Social Structure of the First Crusade (Boston: Brill; 2008) 12. 
212 France. Victory in the East, 333. The Fatimids had taken possession of Jerusalem in August 1098, 
shortly after the fall of Antioch. It was previously held by the Artukid Turks, who France suggests had been 
weakened by committing forces to Antioch’s relief.  
213 Gibb. The Damascus Chronicle, 17-8. 
214 Hill. Raymond D’Aguilers, 84. France. Victory in the East, 119-20. 
80 
 
knights to form a defensive rearguard, weakening the fore of his army.215 Furthermore, when 
they arrived at Caphalia, shortly after their peaceful negotiations with the King of Shaizar, in 
either late January or early February 1099, Raymond’s faction of crusaders found the city 
abandoned and plundered it for all its food, wine, oil and fodder.216 Additionally they acquired 
around 5,000 herd animals, such as cattle, donkeys and camels which would serve as food or 
pack animals.217 Raymond could not afford to leave the abandoned stores of food and animals, as 
both were needed to bolster his own forces. As for the size of his force approaching Arqah in 
early February 1099, Raymond now commanded 1,000 knights, newly mounted on as many 
horses, roughly 5,000 infantry, and 5,000 animals.218 In a month since his departure from 
Ma’arrat, Raymond had not only doubled the size of his cavalry force, but had taken his army 
from the brink of starvation and brought them back into fighting strength, travelling at least 110 
miles in his journey. While stationed outside Arqah some of Raymond IV’s men would seize the 
port cities of Tortosa and Maraclea by February 17, 1099, renewing his access to the 
Mediterranean.219 These cities were roughly 25 and 35 miles north east of Arqah respectively, 
and directly south of Jabala. They were taken without a single casualty, days after Raymond IV 
took up his position outside Arqah.220  
As for Godfrey and Robert of Flanders’ faction, which rejoined Raymond IV’s army at 
Arqah in March of 1099, their march from Antioch had been delayed until late February, after 
the start of Raymond IV’s siege of Arqah. Their route began in Laodicea, shown in Figure 11, 
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from which they followed the coastline south.221 Given that their faction enjoyed the logistical 
benefits of keeping close proximity to the coast and Mediterranean naval commerce, theirs was a 
more belligerent march. They went the offensive, rallying their forces at Laodicea, and 
subsequently setting the city of Jabala to siege in early March.222 
 
Figure 11 The March South, March-July 1099. Image from Baldric of Bourgueil History of the Jerusalemites, by Susan B. 
Edgington, page xiii. 
In sharp contrast to Raymond, Godfrey and Robert spurned peace in favor of conflict. Albert of 
Aachen writes:  
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Soon afterwards, when they had heard of the destruction of Albara and Ma’arra and the 
killing of their Turkish inhabitants, and now of the long siege of Arqa and the assault on 
it, the Saracen soldiers took counsel with the citizens and offered an enormous sum of 
money to Duke Godfrey and Robert of Flanders, in return for which the city of Jabala 
would remain untouched by them, with its citizens, its vines and all fruits, and their army 
would move on elsewhere. This was flatly refused by the Christian princes, unless the 
town was surrendered to their power with its keys. Therefore, the townspeople and the 
magistracy realized that the aforesaid princes could not be bribed to move away their 
camp by offers of money or by other precious gifts…223  
 
Albert continues this narrative by suggesting that Raymond IV colluded with the rulers of Jabala 
to convince the other Crusade leaders to abandon the siege in exchange for a substantial 
monetary reward.224 Regardless of any accusations of collusion, Jabala was not as logistically 
important as Arqah, as it could be bypassed by incoming trade fleets in favor of Maraclea or 
Tortosa, with Laodicea serving as a potential port of call for these ships if they needed to 
resupply before continuing south. Arqah sat on the lower slopes of Mount Lebanon 147 meters 
above sea-level, overlooking three roads to crusader-held or crusader-sympathetic cities, such as 
Tortosa and Homs, and could help defend caravans travelling along those roads, if the crusaders 
could take it.225 
Having been convinced by Raymond IV to break their siege, Godfrey’s forces were 
presented with gifts from the emir of Jabala, namely gold and mules.226 Raymond stood to gain 
tremendously by having the other leaders rejoin him, as they commanded a combined force of an 
estimated 200 knights and between 4,000 and 5,000 infantry.227 These numbers come by way of 
John France, as Raymond D’Aguilers is uncharacteristically silent on the number of crusader 
forces at Arqah, and suggest that neither Godfrey nor Robert of Flanders had been able to 
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augment their cavalry with fresh knights since parting ways with Raymond IV at Ma’arrat. The 
additional infantry would have doubled Raymond’s forces, yielding an army of 10,000 infantry, 
and a not insubstantial cavalry force of 1,200 knights, a considerable force to meet any assumed 
threat or to aid in a siege. Meanwhile the mules Godfrey had been gifted would augment the 
reunited crusader army’s growing herd of beasts of burden. The gold would both help recoup 
Raymond’s expenses, and aid in future purchases on the road to Jerusalem. Regardless of his true 
motivations, whether fear or avarice, Raymond IV needed the force of arms and wealth brought 
by Godfrey and Robert if he was to continue to Jerusalem.  
While Arqah’s location was strategically and logistically advantageous, the siege was 
ultimately abandoned and the crusader army moved towards Tripoli.228 The Gesta author 
indicates that the decision to move forward was largely influenced by the hope that the crusaders 
could reach Jerusalem before the end of the spring harvest, which their leaders hoped to take to 
feed their armies.229 At Tripoli, the crusaders resupplied. While Raymond D’Aguilers writes of a 
glorious crusader victory at Tripoli, which he places before the crusaders abandoning of Arqah, 
his is the only account to tell of such a conflict. By contrast, Peter Tudebode writes,  
They took leave of Arqah and arrived before Tripoli on the sixth day of the week on the 
thirteenth day of the incoming May, where they remained for three days. The King of 
Tripoli made an agreement with Raymond of Saint-Gilles and the other lords by which he 
immediately released more than three hundred prisoners whom he had captured in prior 
battles. He also gave to Count Raymond fifteen thousand bezants, fifteen high-priced 
horses, and assured an abundant sale of horses, asses, bread and all necessary goods, thus 
insuring the entire Christian army of plenty.230  
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This account is nearly identical to the one presented in Gesta Francorum, with the sole exception 
being that the Gesta author provides no information on the amount of gold or horses changing 
hands. The crusader army did appear to grow in size as a result of the negotiations in Tripoli with 
their combined fighting force looking to be somewhere in the order of 14,000. 
Taking the coastal route to Jerusalem meant that the crusaders’ hastened march south 
would no longer suffer for lack of access to trade. However, as their departure from Tripoli came 
before the arrival of Byzantine emissaries, their Byzantine alliance was effectively over. Naval 
support would now come exclusively from Genoa. Their march was uneventful apart from the 
crusaders’ thirst prior to reaching Beirut. Hunger would not become an issue until June. By June 
3, 1099, the crusaders reached Ramla, where they commissioned one of their bishops to restore a 
church, leaving “one-tenth of the gold, silver, animals and horses, so that the bishop could live 
most honorably with those who remained with him.”231 While a ten percent tithe to the church 
was indeed pious, it was logistically problematic as four days later the army arrived in Jerusalem, 
where they spent the following ten days without food. Of this, the Gesta author writes,  
During this siege we could not buy bread for nearly ten days, until a messenger arrived 
from our ships, and we suffered so badly from thirst that we had to take our horses and 
other beasts six miles to water, enduring great terror and apprehension on the way. The 
pool of Siloam, at the foot of Mount Sion, kept us going, but the water was sold very 
dearly in the army.232  
 
The crusaders’ food troubles would be alleviated by the arrival of the Genoese fleet at Jaffa. 
However, water was scarce at Jerusalem. The only reliable source of water sat six miles away at 
the Pool of Siloam. As the eyewitness accounts indicate that the water was transported by hoof 
and foot, it seems that the crusaders no longer possessed wagons or carts for transportation.233 
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The crusaders’ answer to the problem of transporting the water they needed was crude and 
consequential. To quote Peter Tudebode:  
In the course of the siege scarcity of water plagued the crusaders so much that they 
stitched the skins of oxen, buffalo, and goats into leather bottles and lugged water in them 
for six miles. Such foul and stinking water was drunk from these canteens that daily we 
were in great misery and torment because of the fetid water and barley bread.234  
 
Utilizing these makeshift canteens allowed them to move the water. However, as the hides were 
untanned, unwashed, and likely taken from animals dying of thirst or heat, they spread disease 
throughout the crusader camp.235  
The site of Jerusalem made it difficult to blockade, and its proximity to other cities such 
as Bethlehem, and Nabulus meant that the crusaders would have to divert portions of their now 
over 13,000-strong army to subdue their surroundings.236 The three valleys of Hinnon, Qidron 
Jehosophat descend from Jerusalem’s western, southeastern, and eastern walls respectively, as 
can be seen in both Figures 12 and 13 below, with the slope of Mount Zion rising in the 
southwest. Close to 28 miles of stone walls surrounded the city, though no record of their height 
seems to remain. The surrounding region was devoid of trees and the grass was poor fodder for 
the animals, contributing to the aforementioned issues with food supply.237 As advantageous as 
their position was, the Fatimid defenders were able to easily rebuff the crusaders’ initial rushed 
attack on the city.238 So the siege began, with the crusaders deciding that proper siege engines 
would need to be constructed, which meant acquiring lumber. Compared to the siege of Antioch, 
the crusaders faced a more dire set of initial conditions for the siege of Jerusalem. 
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Figure 12 Crusaders' First Arrival at Jerusalem June 7-12, 1099. Image from Victory in the East by John France, page 338. 
Despite these challenges, the siege of Jerusalem was concluded just over one month, from June 7 
through July 15, 1099. Its comparative ease had but one primary cause, the arrival of six 
Genoese ships at Jaffa on June 17, 1099.239  
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Sitting just over 43 miles from the city of Jerusalem, Jaffa was easily a full day’s journey 
away by Raymond D’Aguilers’ observations.240 The city had been previously abandoned and 
mostly razed in an attempt by its previous Fatimid owners to deprive the crusaders of a valuable 
port city by means of destroying its fortifications. Nonetheless, the harbor was in good enough 
condition for the ships to make port and unload the crusaders’ much-needed supplies, 
specifically lumber and food. Each of these ships would have had a maximum cargo capacity 
ranging between 95 and 450 metric tons yielding a potential total load of supplies and provisions 
between 570 and 2,700 metric tons for the over 13,000 crusaders at Jerusalem.241 To survive 
their ordeal, which lasted for four weeks after the ships’ arrival, and making the assumption that 
each knight possessed only a single horse at Jerusalem, the crusaders would have required a 
minimum of 1,291.36 metric tons of food imported on these ships, not counting the needs of 
their pack animals.242  
The minimum requirements suggest that for the crusaders’ needs to have been satisfied 
by just six ships, the ships would have to be substantially larger than those suggested by 
Bachrach in his discussion of naval support at Antioch. He claims that the ships supplying 
Antioch were medium-sized with a capacity around 100 tons, and they could support the 30,000 
crusaders’ needs. Raymond IV of St. Gilles seems to have taken the initiative on ensuring the 
supplies transportation from Jaffa, mobilizing his forces upon hearing word the supplies had 
arrived.243 Transporting the food and supplies back to Jerusalem cost the crusaders all but one of 
the ships which had brought them, as they were attacked by Egyptian ships the day after 
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unloading, though their sacrifice bought enough time for the supply train to escape far enough to 
make it to Jerusalem intact.244 
 
Figure 13 Final Attack on Jerusalem July 13-15, 1099. Image from Victory in the East by John France, page 340. 
The Genoese ships brought not only food, but lumber and skilled labor, though the 
quantities of which are hard to determine. This was utilized to supplement lumber found by 
Robert of Flanders at Nablus, 47 miles north of Jerusalem, which Albert of Aachen suggests was 
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transported by camel back to Jerusalem in safety.245 However, none of the eyewitnesses nor any 
of the other chroniclers corroborate this account. They simply suggest that the crusaders began 
the construction of siege weapons with imported wood. It is hard to determine which source was 
yielded more wood, though the Genoese fleet was burdened with the crusaders’ food supplies. 
The importation of the lumber was the key logistical element in simplifying the siege of 
Jerusalem. The wood brought by Robert of Flanders from Nabulus seems to have been cut 
smaller than that brought by the fleet, understandable considering it was suggested to be 
transported by camel rather than merchant ship. Fulcher of Chartres suggests that the northern 
tower was built in piecemeal fashion from smaller pieces of lumber, to be assembled as a full 
tower in the night preceding their final assault.246 However, in Raymond IV’s camp, the beams 
their craftsmen were working with were of immense size, with Raymond D’Aguilers suggesting 
that, “You could see fifty or sixty of them carrying on their shoulders a building beam too heavy 
for four pairs of oxen to drag.” The magnitude of size suggested for these beams may be an 
exaggeration, however, the southernmost tower appears to have been completed as a single unit, 
as opposed to the northern tower’s assembly in parts, suggesting larger building materials for its 
construction. In addition to the two towers, the crusaders spent the next four weeks of the siege 
building more elaborate siege weapons, including a battering ram, scrofae, and several 
mangonels with which they intended to assault the city.247 Compared to the single siege tower 
constructed at Ma’arrat, the siege weapons at Jerusalem included far more complex and intricate 
machinery, which would have required a degree of engineering that further suggests the presence 
of skilled laborers. The siege of Jerusalem was undertaken with a degree of logistical proficiency 
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that the crusaders had not exhibited in the campaign since the siege of Nicaea. The final battle of 
Jerusalem was decided over the course of about two days from when the first waves of crusaders 
entered the city.248 Victory had come on the back of camels, in the hulls of ships, and in the form 
of lumber. 
Jerusalem fell to the crusaders on July 15, 1099 nearly four years after the Crusade had 
been called. Though Bohemond did not participate in the battle, his aid was a necessary 
component for the crusaders’ victory. He had established contact and trade relations with Genoa, 
and their promises of aid outlasted his own commitment to the Crusade. This enabled the 
crusaders take Jerusalem, a city no less impressive than Antioch, in a fraction of the time. The 
siege of Jerusalem was won by the crusader armies led by Godfrey of Bouillon, Raymond IV of 
St. Gilles, and Robert of Flanders, but their victory was made possible through trade and 
planning organized by Bohemond. Though the crusaders would fight one more battle at Ascalon 









“With the fall of the city it was rewarding to see the worship of the pilgrims at the Holy 
Sepulchre, the clapping of hands, the rejoicing and sing of a new song to the Lord. Their souls 
offered to the victorious and triumphant God prayers of praise which they could not explain in 
words.”249 This is the scene that Raymond D’Aguilers presents in the aftermath of the crusaders 
victory at Jerusalem, the scene for which the crusaders had sacrificed so much. However, as with 
Ma’arrat, the crusaders’ victory was accompanied by atrocity, as the Gesta author, Ralph of 
Caen, and Guibert de Nogent suggest that the crusaders massacred the defenders, driving them 
back to the Temple of Solomon and set about ransacking the city.250 The crusaders made no 
distinction between combatant and civilian, with the Gesta author suggesting that the crusaders’ 
brutality intimidated the defenders enough to drive them to commit suicide, as “they threw 
themselves down headlong from the Temple.”251 Such were the results of the crusaders’ 
campaign. 
Four years, upwards of 80,000 people in total, thousands of metric tons of food, fodder, 
lumber, and weaponry, thousands of wagons, carts, pack beasts, and warhorses, all had been 
committed to bring about this final victory. The Crusades have served as a point of interest for a 
variety of historical disciplines, but first and foremost, the Crusades were wars, with armies, 
commanders, battles, tactics, atrocities, and above all logistics. Logistics shape the course of 
warfare to a far greater degree than individual battles or commanders, simply by influencing the 
starting conditions of any given battle. The First Crusade stands as the single instance in which 
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one such war was called for in Medieval Europe and executed in the Middle East, where the 
crusaders stood victorious at the end. Victory at Jerusalem in July of 1099 was the result of 
logistical planning, execution, and adaptation across a four-year long campaign, without which 
the crusaders would have been incapable of succeeding.  
Of the upwards of 80,000 people who departed Northern and Western Europe to 
undertake the First Crusade, only around 20,000 boarded ships at Laodicea to return home in the 
wake of the battle of Ascalon.252 Transporting the food, weapons, animals, money, and other 
supplies necessary to support an army of this size was a considerable task, the responsibility for 
which rested largely on the shoulders of the Crusade leaders. The Crusade leaders’ understanding 
of logistics was the most direct cause for their overarching success in their campaign, however, 
they had learned much in their march to Jerusalem. European noblemen and knights had to adapt 
familiar Western logistical systems to a Middle Eastern theater which would resist them with 
both its human and natural landscape. Their task was made possible by the thousands of ships, 
carts, wagons, and pack beasts, along with the strength of their own backs, which transported 
their supplies. These logistical systems were more important than the knights and soldiers who 
fought the crusaders’ battles, for the simple reason that they would have been unable to fight 
without their food or armaments.  
Logistics stood as the primary military concern for the crusaders’ approach to their 
campaign, and governed their success. Their approach to battle and preference for siege warfare 
was meant to deprive their enemies of resources and mitigate losses and risk on their own side. 
The crusade leaders’ approach to their campaign greatly resembles the tactics and thought that 
Vegetius outlined in De Re Militari. This fact is made evident in the care they took in preparing 
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their invasion, their preferences for siege warfare, and their aggressive foraging and raiding 
while in enemy territory. For the crusade leaders, logistics were not just important to military 
endeavors, they were central to the very practice of warfare. Each of the crusaders’ victories, 
including both sieges of Antioch, derive from their understanding of their logistical situation, 
which informed their tactics during battle and decision-making on the march. Acquiring the 
resources needed to feed and fuel their campaign required the crusaders not only to forage and 
pillage supplies from their enemies, but also to negotiate for market access with foreign leaders 
open to diplomacy. Such skills were indispensable for the Crusade leaders, particularly Raymond 
IV of St. Gilles, who commanded the largest individual force among the nobles, and showed just 
how useful such skills were in January and February of 1099. In this, the crusaders were indebted 
the previous decades of political instability and warfare in the Middle East which made the 
possibility of diplomatic negotiations a welcome change. Furthermore, negotiations between the 
Crusade leaders and Byzantine Emperor Alexius, and later on between Bohemond and the 
Genoese, gained the crusaders naval support which was absolutely necessary for their survival. 
Byzantine-led shipping sustained the crusaders where other methods of acquiring provisions 
failed. Yet, despite this fact, the Byzantine’s efforts remained undervalued by the Crusade 
chroniclers, who saw the Byzantines traitors to their alliance, and attributed their successes to the 
manifest will of God.  
However, while the crusaders’ triumphs were the result of logistical successes, their trials 
were also directly related to logistical failings, largely the result of the crusaders having to come 
to terms with the unfamiliar environmental conditions of the Middle East including aridity, 
seasonal weather patterns, and topography. Summers and winters were both devastating to the 
crusader armies. Summer heat and aridity robbed them of many of their animals both in the 
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march to Antioch and at the siege of Jerusalem. Meanwhile the two most dire instances of 
crusader starvation occurred at the siege of Antioch and occupation of Ma’arrat where during the 
winter the crusaders found their potential trade routes and supply lines cut off by ice in the 
Amanus Mountains and the sheer distance separating Ma’arrat from the Orontes River. Of these 
instances, though the siege of Antioch persisted for a far longer period of time, and suffered 
greater losses, the crusaders’ occupation of Ma’arrat was the more dire, and had the greater 
effect on the Crusade as a whole despite afflicting far fewer people. During their winter at 
Antioch, the crusaders lost access to their previously conquered cities in the Amanus Mountains 
due to ice blockading the paths, but they maintained access to the Port of St. Symeon. At 
Ma’arrat, Raymond IV’s faction of crusaders, still the largest single force amongst the armies, 
had nothing and their situation prompted him to both advance their march and fundamentally 
change his approach to the campaign until he could replenish his forces. In both cases, famine, 
topography, and distance prevented the crusaders from leveraging their logistical systems of 
forage and trade to their advantage, resulting in their suffering and starvation.  
By focusing on the logistics of the First Crusade as the primary concern in the campaign 
several elements of the Crusade are cast in a new light. Jerusalem was the crusaders’ end goal, 
and the process of arriving there was a chief concern, with the Crusade leaders having to 
consider many options to maximize their chances of success. Decisions typically viewed or 
portrayed as the roguish acts motivated by individual self-interest, such as Baldwin’s diversion to 
Edessa, can be recognized as acts informed by an understanding of their logistical situation. 
Baldwin opened up new sources of provisions, wealth, and horses for the crusaders going 
forward which allowed him to contribute to their overall victory from a distance. Furthermore, 
when addressed as a logistical endeavor the Crusade becomes an extended campaign of resource 
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acquisition and management, an all-important factor which can easily become eclipsed in the 
pursuit of religious, cultural, and other military foci. 
This thesis set out to address the logistics of the First Crusade as a whole, attempting to 
achieve a comprehensive understanding of how the crusaders managed to lead their only 
successful foray into the Middle East, despite possessing none of the landholdings, and inherent 
advantages of said landholdings, present in the later crusades. The results of this analysis indicate 
that the crusade leaders approached the crusade as an extended campaign, with their strategy and 
tactics being heavily informed by their recognition of the supreme role of logistics in 
determining military success. The nobles took their time in preparations, gathering money, 
people, animals, resources and provisions well in advance of their arrival in the Middle East. As 
a result, not only were they able to arrive in Asia Minor and the Middle East with their armies 
intact, but they also possessed the money and knowledge necessary to compensate for their 
losses incurred by environmental and geopolitical factors beyond their power to control. 
Furthermore, the crusade leaders showed an incredible ability to adapt, at times utilizing 
diplomacy to bolster their existing logistical systems, or acquire entirely new sources of 
provisions. Bohemond established trade relations with the Genoese that would ultimately save 
the Crusade he abandoned as they sat outside Jerusalem. Meanwhile Raymond IV fundamentally 
changed his approach to the Crusade, enabling him to turn a starving force protected by less than 
500 knights into a provisioned robust army 1,000 knights and 1,500 infantry strong in the course 
of a single month after Ma’arrat. Their central focus on logistics allowed the crusaders to 
overcome tremendous obstacles in their invasion. Their victory was the result their ability, and 
the abilities of their allies, to successfully acquire and move people, provisions, and supplies 
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from Europe to the Middle East, and ultimately to Jerusalem, thus turning potentially hazardous 
battles into comparatively easy wars of attrition. 
The First Crusade started a movement that would long outlast any of its participants. To 
this day, the Crusades capture the minds of historians, inviting new ideas and analysis. However, 
above all else, the First Crusade was a war. It was a war initiated by European combatants who 
recognized the supremacy of logistics in military affairs. Beyond their faith, tactics, or martial 
prowess, it was the crusaders’ mastery and adaptation in the area of logistics which fed their 
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